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Although a view of the environment surrounding a vehicle is critical for driving, 
little effort has been directed at quantifying the quantity and quality of the field of view 
that is required. A small aperture affording a view of the forward scene a few degrees 
wide might be considered the minimum possible exterior view, but most vehicles provide 
drivers with a much wider field of view, encompassing nearly 360 degrees around the 
vehicle.  The total field of view is achieved by indirect vision using mirrors as well as by 
direct vision.   Driver head motions allow a range of vantage points and further expand 
the fields of view.   
Drivers of heavy trucks (10,000 lb and larger) rely to a greater extent than drivers 
of smaller vehicles on indirect vision.  Most heavy trucks provide no view through the 
rear of the vehicle, so vision to the rear is restricted to the view provided by exterior 
mirrors.  Often the geometry of the truck obstructs the view of the area adjacent to the 
truck behind the cab.  The higher driving position typical of heavy trucks increases the 
size of the zone around the vehicle within which vision is obstructed by the vehicle. 
Regulatory requirements for truck driver vision are minimal.   The only standard 
that bears directly on driver fields of view is Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
(FMVSS) 111, which regulates mirror systems.  Trucks over 10,000 lb are required to 
have planar mirrors with an area of at least 323 cm2 on each side of the cab.  Direct vision 
is unregulated.   
Any increase in the visibility of the exterior environment could be viewed as an 
improvement in driver vision, and any decrease could be viewed as negative.  But all 
increases or reductions are unlikely to have the same effects on safety.   For example, 
raising the hood by 10 cm might have a larger effect on safety than lowering the top of 
the windshield by 10 cm.   But whether either change would have a significant impact on 
safety would depend on the baseline condition.  Raising the hood would not matter if the 
potential crash partners remained visible, but lowering the top of the windshield could 
reduce the visibility of traffic control signals if the starting point were sufficiently low.   
Similarly, the potential effects of changes in mirror configurations are difficult to 
determine.  Nearly all heavy trucks currently have mirrors that exceed the FMVSS 111 
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requirements, primarily by the addition of convex mirrors near the mandated planar 
mirrors.   Recently the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has 
requested information on whether fender-mounted convex mirrors should be required 
(NHTSA XX) and has proposed new rules that would mandate indirect vision systems to 
view the area behind certain straight trucks (NHTSA XX).  The potential benefits of the 
rear-view requirement are more apparent because the area immediately behind the truck 
is currently not viewable by the driver.  The potential benefits of fender-mounted convex 
mirrors, which are already present on the right front of about two-thirds of tractor-trailers, 
are more difficult to determine.  
This report presents the results of a study designed to address the contributions of 
the quantity and quality of the field of view to truck safety.  The study was conducted in 
three complementary tasks.  First, an extensive analysis of crash data from several 
sources examined the role of driver vision in truck-initiated crashes (Section 2 of the 
report).  Second, an experimental study of truck drivers’ conflict detection in a lane-
change scenario was conducted (Section 3).   Third, a quantitative method for evaluating 
truck cab designs with respect to near-cab visibility was developed (Section 5).   As part 
of the work, a prioritized set of vision zones around the truck were established to guide 





2.0 ANALYSIS OF CRASH DATA 
 
2.1 Data and Analysis Methods 
Two sources of crash data were used to characterize the crash environment of 
medium and heavy trucks: nationally representative computerized crash files and 
supplementary data collected specifically for this project for selected crash types. 
Nationally Representative Crash Data  — The computerized crash files used were 
the Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) file, which is compiled by UMTRI, and 
the National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates System file (NASS GES, 
referred to simply as GES hereafter), compiled by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. Data files for seven years, 1994-2000, were aggregated for the analysis. 
Multiple years of data were used to improve the resolution of the analysis and to produce 
statistically reliable results. 
The TIFA file is a survey of all medium and heavy trucks1 involved in a fatal 
traffic accident in the United States. A fatal accident includes any traffic accident in 
which one or more persons are fatally injured; the fatality may occur to a truck occupant, 
an occupant of another vehicle, or a nonmotorist. For 1999 and 2000, TIFA is a census 
file, meaning there is a record for each truck involved in a fatal crash. For 1994-1998, 
trucks were sampled to reduce the number of cases processed. For those years, about 60 
percent of trucks involved in a fatal crash were sampled. Weights were determined that 
allow correct national estimates of population totals. The TIFA file provides the most 
accurate and detailed data on trucks involved in a fatal crash available. 
The GES crash file is a nationally representative sample of police-reported 
crashes, covering all vehicles involved in a traffic accident, not just trucks. GES data are 
coded entirely from police-reports. GES is the product of a complex sample survey with 
clustering, stratification, and weighting that allows calculation of national estimates. 
The GES data are used to cover nonfatal truck accidents. The GES file is known 
to underestimate fatal crashes by approximately 20-30 percent. Since the TIFA data are 
                                                
1 The term trucks will be used hereafter to refer to all class 3 and above vehicles. 
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known to be a substantially more accurate representation of fatal truck crash 
involvement, for this analysis TIFA data are used to cover fatal crashes and GES data are 
used to represent nonfatal crashes. To facilitate analysis, an analytical file was built that 
combines TIFA and GES data, with TIFA data covering fatal involvements and GES 
nonfatal. Care was taken to ensure that the variables combined were compatible, or 
recoded to be compatible. In particular, the TIFA file includes an accident type variable 
that codes the relative position and movement of the vehicles prior to the crash. The 
TIFA accident type variable is modeled on the accident type variable in the GES file, so 
they are fully compatible. This variable is of particular use in the present effort since it 
provides critical information on how the crash occurred and, accordingly, the direction to 
the conflict prior to collision. 
Error!
 
Figure 1.  Composition of analysis file: TIFA and GES, 1994-2001. 
 
Figure 1 shows schematically the composition of the analysis data file: the near 
census TIFA file covers fatal crash involvements while the nationally-representative GES 
sample file covers all other crash severities. The shapes are not to scale; fatal crashes 
account for only 1.3 percent of truck crash involvements. However, given their severity 
and the additional detail the TIFA file supplies, it is important to use the most accurate 
data available.  








Supplemental Data Collection for Selected Crash Types — Supplementary data 
were collected for this project to provide greater detail on the events and positions for 
specific crash types. The source of these data was a review of police reports for a set of 
crashes. Such police reports were available because as part of the TIFA data collection 
protocol, UMTRI acquires from the states the original crash reports on all fatal crashes 
involving trucks. These police reports are currently available for 1999 and later (early 
years have been discarded because of storage limitations), and provide a resource to 
examine in some detail specific crash types. 
Three crash types were identified for supplementary data collection. They are: 1) 
start up crashes in which the truck starts from a stopped positions and strikes a 
nonmotorist; 2) right turn crashes in which the truck collides with a nonmotorist while 
making a right turn; and, 3) lane change/merge right2 crashes in which the truck collides 
with another vehicle while merging or changing lanes to the right. In the start up crash 
type, the truck starts from a stopped position and collides with a nonmotorist3, usually but 
not always with the front of the truck. The right turn crashes considered here are those in 
which the truck is turning right, either at an intersection or into a driveway or alleyway, 
and collides with a nonmotorist. In lane change/merge right crashes, the truck changes 
lanes to the right or merges to the right and collides with another vehicle. Note that for 
each crash type, the truck driver initiates the maneuver that leads to the crash. 
The supplemental data collection provides more detailed information about the 
position and movement of the other party—vehicle, pedestrian, or bicyclist—with respect 
to the truck to determine critical vision zones around the truck. The two primary pieces of 
data collected were the position of the other party three to five seconds prior to the 
collision and the position at the decision point for the truck, that is, at the point where the 
truck driver initiated the maneuver. In addition, the general crash type was coded, along 
with the line of travel of the other party, the location of contact, and the point of contact 
on the truck. Information on the use of mirrors prior to the crash was also collected, but 
                                                
2 We will italicize crash types in the text to make the references more clear. Many of the crash types have 
long names because they are very specific. It is hoped that italicizing the names will make it more clear 
when we are referring to a specific crash type. 
3 Nonmotorist is a somewhat awkward term that encompasses pedestrians, bicyclists, and any other person 
not occupying a motorized vehicle, such as roller-bladers, children in strollers, skateboarders, and so on. 
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the use of mirror was mentioned in only ten of 160 cases reviewed, and in none did the 
truck driver report seeing the other party in the mirror prior to the collision. 
Figure 2 shows the interface used in collecting the data. The database was 
developed in Microsoft Access, which provides convenient and flexible tools for entering 
and reviewing data. 
 
Figure 2.  Data collection interface for supplementary crash data. 
 
A total of 160 cases were identified for review. One case was discarded because it 
had been miscoded: vehicle maneuver was coded as turning right, but the narrative on the 
police report indicated that the truck moved to the right as part of an unsuccessful evasive 
maneuver. Another ten cases were considered not applicable to the intended crash type; 
for example, a case where the driver stops his truck to work on the brakes and it rolls 
over him does not belong in the start up crash type, because there is nothing useful to be 
learned about the role of truck driver vision in the crash. After deleting the miscoded and 
not applicable cases, 148 cases yielded usable information. 
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Table 1  
Cases Reviewed for Supplemental Data Collection, 
TIFA 1999-2000 
Crash Type N 
LCM right 40 
Start up (struck nonmotorist) 38 




In this section, we discuss the results of the crash data analysis, both the mass 
crash files—TIFA and GES—as well as the supplemental data collected for specific crash 
types. Figure 3 shows the flow of the crash data analysis. The crash data analysis has a 
number of objectives. The initial goal is to classify truck crash involvements into crash 
types that are meaningful in terms of driver vision, that is, the direction and proximity to 
the conflict. Analysis of the mass crash data in the analytic file built from TIFA and GES 
is used to accomplish this step. Neither direction nor distance to the conflict is directly 
coded in the crash data, but the crash configuration can provide very rough 
approximations for both. Accordingly, crashes are aggregated into categories from which 
inferences where the truck driver should have been looking can be drawn. Within those 
categories, crash configuration in which the truck driver would have to rely on his 
mirrors are identified as “mirror-relevant.” In these crashes, the conflict with the other 
party to the collision occurred in areas around the truck where the driver would have to 
rely on the mirrors to view. In addition, the effect of factors such as weather and light 
condition are considered. Certain crash types of interest were selected to collect 
additional data on the location of the other party around the truck. These cases were 
selected from the fatal (TIFA) data because police reports on them are readily available. 




Figure 3. Analysis of mass crash data and selected crash types. 
 
Analysis of TIFA and GES — The first step in developing the crash configuration 
classification tabulated in Table 2 was to identify crashes in which the truck driver 
initiated the action and in which the driver would have to rely on mirrors to view the area 
in which the conflict occurred. In other words, these are crashes for which the truck 
driver’s use of mirrors is of primary relevance to avoiding the crash. In each case, the 
truck driver is performing the maneuver. For example, in lane change/merge right 
crashes, the truck driver was changing lanes or merging with traffic to the right of the 
truck. Cases in which the other vehicle changed lanes into the truck are excluded, because 
the truck driver’s mirrors are not primarily at issue. Clearly there can be cases where the 
truck driver may view the impending conflict and maneuver to avoid the crash; those 
cases are not included here but rather are captured in the sideswipe, same direction, other 
encroaching category. 
Crash configurations labeled “not truck-mirror-relevant” encompass crash types 
in which the driver would not normally have to rely on the mirrors to view the area of 
impending conflict. The categories used are from a typology developed for crash-
avoidance applications, and provide general information about the nature of the conflict 





Mass crash analysis 








in which the truck struck another vehicle that was stopped or going slower in front of the 
truck. In these crashes, clearly the conflict is in front of the truck and the response of the 
truck is the primary crash avoidance mechanism, either by slowing, steering around the 
conflict, or both. In sideswipe, same direction, other vehicle encroaching crashes, both 
vehicles are proceeding in the same direction and the other vehicle encroaches into the 
truck’s lane. In these crashes, the conflict is to the side of the truck, but the other vehicle 
initiated the crash by moving into the truck’s lane. The other crash types can be subjected 
to a similar analysis. 
In Table 2 the crashes are organized to put similar crash types together. The first 
three crash types are all single vehicle, so they involve primarily the action of the truck 
driver. The others are organized as logical pairs, to group complementary crash types 
together, depending on the role of the truck. For example, rear-end, truck striking and 




Classification of Truck Involvements in Crashes in  
Relation to Truck Driver Vision Zones 
TIFA/GES 1994-2000 
 Crash type N % 
No collision 109,949 4.1 
Ran off road 219,762 8.2 
Hit object* in road 173,708 6.5 
Rear-end, truck striking 296,154 11.1 
Rear-end, truck struck 198,580 7.4 
Sideswipe, same direction, truck encroaching† 16,604 0.6 
Sideswipe, same direction, other encroaching 193,827 7.3 
Head-on, truck encroaching 3,489 0.1 
Head-on other encroaching 12,652 0.5 
Sideswipe, opposite direction, truck encroaching 37,522 1.4 
Sideswipe, opposite direction, other encroaching 55,348 2.1 
Truck turns across other’s path 143,516 5.4 
Other vehicle turns across truck’s path 118,091 4.4 
Both going straight, truck into other’s side 53,088 2.0 
Both going straight, other vehicle into truck’s side 51,466 1.9 
Truck backs into other vehicle† 695 0.0 














Untripped rollover 17,446 0.7 
Truck, lane change/merge right into other vehicle 180,797 6.8 
Truck, lane change/merge left into other vehicle 41,067 1.5 
Truck turns right, other vehicle in blind spot 94,771 3.5 
Truck turns left, other vehicle in blind spot 22,515 0.8 












Truck backs into other vehicle 186,350 7.0 
 Other crash type 411,352 15.4 
 Unknown crash type 14,314 0.5 
 Total 2,671,729 100.0 
* “Objects” are typically pedestrians, bicyclists, or other nonmotorists. 
† Cases are anomalous on impact location, collision, or prior move.  
 
Overall Table 2 shows that mirror-relevant crashes account for 19.7 percent of all 
truck crash involvements. That is, crashes occurring in areas where the truck driver 
would have to rely on mirrors to determine if it is safe to maneuver account for almost 
one out of five crashes in which trucks are involved. In all of these crashes, the truck 
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initiates the crash through a maneuver. In most of these crashes, the conflict is relatively 
close to the truck, since the truck is either in a low speed maneuver, as in the start up, 
backing, or turning crashes, or the relative speeds of the vehicles is low, as in the lane 
change/merge crash types. Among the mirror-relevant crashes, note the dominance of 
crashes where the truck is moving to the right, particularly in lane change/merge (LCM). 
LCM right crashes occur 4.4 times more frequently than LCM left crashes. Similarly, 
right turn crashes are significantly more frequent than left turn crashes. There are 4.2 
right turn (mirror-relevant) crashes for every mirror-relevant crash while turning left. 
Clearly drivers are having much more trouble in maneuvers to the right than to the left. 
Start-up crashes were very hard to identify using available variables. The number is 
likely to be an underestimate. 
While it may be useful to compare complementary crash types, Table 3 shows the 
crash types sorted from most common to least, within the mirror-relevant and other crash 
types. Among the crash types considered not mirror-relevant, rear-end, truck striking was 
the most common, with 11.1 percent of all truck crash involvements. Ran off road, rear-
end, truck struck, and sideswipe, same direction, other encroaching, are all of similar 
magnitude. The most common mirror-relevant crash type is truck backs into other vehicle 
with 7.0 percent of all truck involvements. Lane change/merge right accounts for about 
the same percentage, with 6.8, and is in the top quarter of all crashes. Note that the other 
category actually is the most frequent. The other category includes a wide variety of 





Ranking of Crash Types in Relation to Truck Driver Vision Zones 
TIFA/GES 1994-2000 
 Crash Type N % 
Rear-end, truck striking 296,154 11.1 
Ran off road 219,762 8.2 
Rear-end, truck struck 198,580 7.4 
Sideswipe, same direction, other encroaching 193,827 7.3 
Hit object* in road 173,708 6.5 
Truck turns across other’s path 143,516 5.4 
Other vehicle turns across truck’s path 118,091 4.4 
No collision 109,949 4.1 
Sideswipe, opposite direction, other encroaching 55,348 2.1 
Both going straight, truck into other’s side 53,088 2.0 
Both going straight, other vehicle into truck’s side 51,466 1.9 
Sideswipe, opposite direction, truck encroaching 37,522 1.4 
Other vehicle backs into truck 18,447 0.7 
Untripped rollover 17,446 0.7 
Sideswipe, same direction, truck encroaching† 16,604 0.6 
Head-on other encroaching 12,652 0.5 














Truck backs into other vehicle† 695 0.0 
Truck backs into other vehicle 186,350 7.0 
Truck, lane change/merge right into other vehicle 180,798 6.8 
Truck turns right, other vehicle in blind spot 94,771 3.5 
Truck, lane change/merge left into other vehicle 41,067 1.5 












Truck starts up from stop 215 0.0 
 Other crash type 411,352 15.4 
 Unknown crash type 14,314 0.5 
 Total 2,671,729 100.0 
* “Objects” are typically pedestrians, bicyclists, or other nonmotorists. 
† Cases are anomalous on impact location, collision, or prior move.  
 
Table 4 shows the definitions for the mirror-relevant crash types. While 
developing this set of crash types, the goal was to identify crashes that occurred in an 
area where the truck driver would have to use his mirror to successfully complete a 
maneuver. Each bullet point essentially corresponds to a set of code values for a 
particular variable. Since crashes as they actually occur on the roads do not readily sort 
 
13 
themselves into neat categories, and since crash investigators can make mistakes, 
consistency was required across multiple variables to increase the probability that crashes 
assigned to a particular category were roughly similar. For example, in the case of lane 
change/merge right, certain codes in the accident type variable define the crash type, but 
in some cases the first contact was on the left or rear of the vehicle, and where movement 
prior to the crash was a left turn. Such cases might be genuine inconsistencies or the 
crash itself may have been anomalous. But whatever the explanation, the crashes were 
excluded to avoid contaminating the category. Note that in both the left and right turn 
categories, the vehicle collided with was approaching from the rear of the truck. 
Table 5 shows the categories of driver vision zones that can be reasonably 
inferred from the crash types and other information available in the crash files, and 
provides the reasoning supporting the classification. The goal is to identify the direction 
from the driver to the impending conflict. The classification was developed using the 
crash types developed above, along with the more detailed accident type information and 
information about the location of the first impact on the vehicle. The table describes the 





Identification of Mirror-Relevant or Indirect Driver Vision Crashes 
Crash Type Definition 
Lane change/merge right • Same trafficway, same direction accident 
type move to right 
• First impact on right side 
• Prior move is lane change, merge, or going 
straight 
Lane change/merge left • Same trafficway, same direction accident 
type move to left 
• First impact on left side 
• Prior move is lane change or merge 
Right turn • Change trafficway, accident type is turn to 
right, with other vehicle approaching from 
behind 
• First impact on right 
or 
• First harmful event is collision with 
pedestrian or pedalcyclist 
• First impact on right side 
• Prior move is right turn 
Left turn • Change trafficway, accident type is turn to 
left, with other vehicle approaching from 
behind 
• Prior move is left turn 
• Impact point on left 
Backing • Accident type is backing 
• First harmful event is collision 
Start up • Prior move is stopped or starting up in 
traffic lane 
•  First harmful event is collision with 
pedestrian or pedalcyclist 





Driver Vision Zone Definitions 
Direction to 
Conflict Definition 
Forward Straight in front of vehicle. For example, rear-ends where the truck is the striking 
vehicle, or start-up collisions with pedestrians. 
Right 
forward 
Conflict is in right adjacent lane, for example, striking a parked vehicle in the parking 
lane. Also includes same direction sideswipes where the contact point was on the front 
right corner. 
Right These are mostly crashes that occur when the vehicles are on intersecting roadways. 
As an example, for the vehicle coded 87 in the diagram here, the conflict is coming 
from the right. Actually, it is to the right only at the point of impact. Prior to that (i.e., 
when the view might have been relevant to the driver), the direction would be more 
like 60º. The right and left categories are used only for cases where the vehicles pre-
crash were on intersecting roads.  
Right rear Direction to the other vehicle is on the right side, toward the rear of the vehicle. Most 
of these cases are from the mirror-relevant group. 
Right, 
general 
Conflict was to the right of the vehicle, but it cannot be determined if it was forward, 
rear, or in the middle. Many of these are same direction sideswipes. The contact 
information is not detailed enough to know whether the other vehicle was to the right 
front of the truck, roughly in the middle, or toward the rear. 
Rear Directly to the rear of the truck. Includes mostly rear-end struck and truck backed into 
other vehicle. 
Left, rear Consistent with right rear 
Left Consistent with right 
Left forward Consistent with right forward: these are mostly head-ons and opposite direction 
sideswipes. It is assumed they are all cases of conflicts with vehicles initially in the 
adjacent lane. Some fraction are actually cases where the vehicle is already in the 
truck’s lane, such as cases where the other vehicle used an exit ramp as an entrance 
ramp. There is no way to identify such cases in the data, but it is likely the fraction is 
very small. 
Left, general Consistent with right, general. 
No conflict These are cases, as far as can be determined, where driver vision to whatever it is he is 
hitting, is not of primary relevance to the crash. Includes untripped rollovers, for 
example, and cases where the driver drove or skidded off the road and was not 
maneuvering to avoid something in the road. Category also includes noncollision 
events, such as fires, explosions, falling from vehicle, and so on. 
Unknown Insufficient information to deduce direction to the conflict from the configuration of 
the crash and impact point the direction to the conflict. Many are coded unknown or 
other on accident configuration. Point of impact on the truck does not imply the vector 






Table 6 shows the results of aggregating truck crash involvements into the 
categories described in the table above. Note that directly forward and directly to the rear 
are both about the same magnitude, and directly right and directly left are both about the 
same magnitude. Table 6 includes all crashes, not just those the truck driver initiated by 
maneuvering. 
Table 6 
Classification of Crashes by Direction to Conflict  
TIFA/GES 1994-2000 
Direction to 
Conflict N % 
Forward 419,569 15.7 
Right forward 50,887 1.9 
Right 132,134 4.9 
Right rear 94,839 3.5 
Right, general 315,557 11.8 
Rear 395,725 14.8 
Left, rear 23,739 0.9 
Left 146,362 5.5 
Left forward 206,649 7.7 
Left, general 162,438 6.1 
No conflict 319,611 12.0 
Unknown 404,220 15.1 
Total 2,671,729 100.0 
 
The distribution may be more readily seen in Figure 4. In this figure, the no 
conflict and unknown categories are dropped, and the percentages recalculated for all 
cases with known conflicts. The percentages at the corners on the front and rear of the 
truck identify right forward and right rear, left forward and left rear.  The percentages for 
crash involvements in which the direction to the conflict was more or less directly to the 
left or right, as at an intersection, are labeled as intersection crashes. The “general” 
categories show the percentages of crash involvements in which the conflict was to the 






Figure 4.  Distribution of direction to conflict, TIFA/GES 1994-2000. 
 
Again, the proportion of conflicts to the front and rear are nearly equal, as are 
conflicts directly to the left and right. Left forward is significantly higher than right 
forward, 10.6 percent to 2.6 percent. Conflicts to the left forward in this classification 
result in head-on collisions or sideswipes in which the vehicles are moving in opposite 
directions. These occur primarily on roads with two-way traffic. 
However, the figure also depicts the limits of attempting to determine with 
confidence the direction to the conflict using the computerized record alone. For many 
crash types it was not possible to classify the direction to the conflict in other than 
general terms, i.e., left general or right general. 
Table 7 shows distribution of vision zones by crash severity. Crashes are divided 
between more serious (fatal, A-injury, or B-injury) and the less serious (C-injury or no 
injury) crash involvements, and the distribution of the driver vision zone is shown for 
each. Since most crash involvements include only minor or no injury, fatal, A-injury, and 
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B-injury involvements are combined to accumulate sufficient sample size for meaningful 
comparisons. Crashes in which the vehicles were going in opposite directions are much 
more serious than those in which they were going in the same direction, because closing 
speeds prior to impact are typically much lower. Note that the left forward zone accounts 
for 24.1 percent of the more serious involvements, but only 8.6 percent of the less 
serious. Head-on collisions and sideswipes in which the vehicles are going in opposite 
directions account for many of the involvements in the left forward zone. The right, 
general zone tends to include less severe crash involvements: only 8.2 percent of serious 
but 16.9 percent of less serious involvements. Many involvements assigned to the right, 
general zone are same direction sideswipes, where closing speeds are low. In contrast, 
crashes in which the conflict was to the left or right—these crashes typically occur at 
intersections where the vehicles are crossing paths—are overrepresented among serious 
crash involvements. Overall, the left and right zones account for 21.7% of more serious 
truck involvements and only 13.5 percent of the less serious. 
Table 7 
Distribution of Crash Severity by Direction to Conflict 
TIFA/GES 1994-2000 
Fatal, A-, and B-
Injury C-injury and No Injury Direction to 
Conflict N % N % 
Forward 45,695 18.8 357,646 22.1 
Right forward 2,654 1.1 44,760 2.8 
Right 26,569 10.9 101,060 6.2 
Right rear 5,311 2.2 87,458 5.4 
Right, general 20,036 8.2 272,930 16.9 
Rear 43,336 17.8 339,795 21.0 
Left forward 58,477 24.1 139,484 8.6 
Left 26,247 10.8 117,196 7.2 
Left, rear 2,242 0.9 21,366 1.3 
Left, general 12,399 5.1 136,972 8.5 
Total 242,966 100.0 1,618,667 100.0 
 
Examination of specific crash types can shed more light on the role of driver 
vision in truck crashes and certain factors that affect it. Table 2 above showed significant 
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disparity in crash involvements when the truck was maneuvering to the left in 
comparison with maneuvers to the right. Specifically, in maneuvers where the truck 
driver must use the mirrors to determine if the maneuver is safe, LCM crashes to the right 
are 4.4 times more frequent than LCM crashes to the left. Crashes in which the truck was 
executing a right turn at an intersection and collided with something to the truck’s right 
are 4.2 times more frequent than analogous left turn crash involvements. In both crash 
types, (LCM right/left and turning left/right), the driver must use mirrors to determine if 
the maneuver is safe. Moreover, the driver’s view to the right generally is more difficult, 
because the passenger side mirror is farther away than the driver side mirror, so the image 
will be smaller and more difficult to interpret. 
Both weather and light condition may affect the driver’s ability to use the mirrors 
effectively. In this section, the effect of weather and light condition on two crash types 
will be considered. 
In rainy or wet weather, splash and spray can coat the mirror and windows, 
obscuring the driver’s view. In dark conditions, the driver will be able to see less in the 
mirror than in daylight. On the other hand, headlamps of other vehicles in the mirror will 
be particularly salient and the driver may be able to see light reflected on the road from 
the headlamps of vehicles traveling alongside the truck. Thus, weather and light condition 
both affect driver vision and may have an effect on the types of crashes that occur by 
making certain types more likely. 
The presumed effect of weather with respect to mirrors is that precipitation and 
spray may obscure the image in the mirror, making it more difficult for the driver to 
judge if the way is clear. Thus, mirror-relevant crashes may be more likely in adverse 
weather. The table shows that crashes in which truck drivers rely on mirrors are actually 
relatively less frequent in adverse weather (precipitation or fog) than in good weather. 
“No adverse conditions” accounted for 89.4 percent of mirror-relevant involvements, but 




Mirror-Relevant Involvements and Weather Condition 
TIFA/GES 1994-2000 
Mirror-relevant Non-mirror relevant 
Weather N % N % 
No adverse condition 469,765 89.4 1,747,132 82.0 
Precipitation 48,672 9.3 328,792 15.4 
Fog 978 0.2 13,339 0.6 
Other 1,220 0.2 16,904 0.8 
Unknown 5,088 1.0 25,526 1.2 
Total 525,723 100.0 2,131,693 100.0 
 
The data tabulated in Table 8 consider all types of mirror-relevant crashes 
together and shows that they are not more likely in adverse conditions than other crashes. 
However, the presumed effect of precipitation and spray on mirrors may operate 
differently in different types of crashes, and may be detected by considering pairs of 
complementary crash types. In both lane change and turns, the driver’s reliance on the 
mirrors depends on the direction of the maneuver.  Similarly, LCM maneuvers to the 
right are more difficult than LCM maneuvers to the left. 
Table 9 shows how adverse weather in the form of rain, snow, or sleet changes 
the relationship between maneuvers to the left and right. The numbers in the cells are the 
ratio of right to left crash involvements for the two crash types in two conditions. Where 
there are no adverse weather conditions, LCM right involvements occur 4.40 times more 
frequently than LCM left. In rain, snow, or sleet conditions, where splash or spray might 
obscure the mirror, one might expect an even higher ratio of right to left. In fact, the ratio 
is somewhat higher, 4.86 to 4.40, which is an increase of about 10 percent. However, for 
the turning crash type, the ratio of right to left is actually lower in rain, snow, or sleet, by 
about 10 percent. Thus for one crash type, adverse weather seems to raise the ratio 













Ratio right to left lane 
change/ merge 4.40 4.86 
Ratio right to left turns 4.33 3.88 
 
The interpretation of this result is not clear, but note that the effect is small. 
Adverse weather accounts for only about a 10 percent change in the ratio, while the ratio 
itself, which is the effect of using mirror to maneuver left and right, shows increases of 
several hundred percent. The underlying data—from TIFA and GES—is a combination 
of seven years from a near-census file and a complex, stratified sample, so calculating 
confidence intervals for this result would be very difficult and indeed cost-prohibitive. 
However, the effect of weather appears to be relatively small, and may not exist. Weather 
is taken as a surrogate for splash and spray, and it is assumed that spray on the mirrors 
would reduce the driver’s ability to use them. It seems likely, in light of the result, that 
either adverse weather does not obscure the mirrors or that the spray is not sufficient to 
hinder their use. 
Light condition may also affect mirror-relevant crashes. However, Table 10 
shows that the overall distribution of mirror-relevant crashes by light condition differs 
only somewhat from the same distribution for other truck crash involvements. Non-
mirror-relevant involvements have a somewhat lower proportion of the daylight 
condition, 78.7 percent compared with 84.3 for the mirror-relevant involvements. This 
difference is consistent with an elevated proportion of non-mirror-relevant crashes in the 
dark condition, 9.7 percent compared with 4.7 for mirror-relevant crashes. If anything, 
crashes in which the driver had direct vision of the conflict are more likely in dark 




Light Condition and Mirror-Relevant Crashes 
TIFA/GES 1994-2000 
Mirror-relevant Non-mirror-relevant Unknown Total Light 
condition N % N % N % N % 
Daylight 443,058 84.3 1,677,070 78.7 10,346 72.3 2,130,474 79.7 
Dark/lighted 39,708 7.6 162,421 7.6 1,111 7.8 203,239 7.6 
Dark 24,824 4.7 207,596 9.7 1,324 9.2 233,745 8.7 
Dawn/Dusk 13,162 2.5 63,686 3.0 672 4.7 77,519 2.9 
Unknown 4,964 0.9 20,926 1.0 862 6.0 26,752 1.0 
Total 525,715 100.0 2,131,699 100.0 14,315 100.0 2,671,730 100.0 
 
However, Table 11 shows that the distribution of crash types varies by light 
condition, particularly when the two pairs of complementary crash configurations are 
considered. In the daylight condition, 6.6 percent of involvements are LCM right, 
compared with 1.6 percent LCM left. The relative percentages are similar in dark 
conditions, but in dark/lighted conditions 9.6 percent are LCM right and only 1.3 percent 
are LCM left. LCM right crashes are even more over-involved in dark/lighted conditions. 




Table 11  
Mirror-Relevant Crash Types by Light Condition 
TIFA/GES 1994-2000 




Dusk Unk. Total 
LCM, right 140,399 19,564 14,613 5,152 1,069 180,797 
LCM, left 34,481 2,550 2,588 545 904 41,067 
Right turn 82,893 6,590 2,252 2,795 241 94,771 
Left turn 20,551 741 452 447 323 22,515 
Start up 175 36 4 0 0 215 
Backing 164,559 10,227 4,916 4,222 2,427 186,351 
Non-mirror-relevant 1,677,070 162,421 207,596 63,686 20,926 2,131,699 
Unknown 10,346 1,111 1,324 672 862 14,315 
Total 2,130,474 203,239 233,745 77,519 26,752 2,671,730 
 Column percentages 
LCM, right 6.6 9.6 6.3 6.6 4.0 6.8 
LCM, left 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.7 3.4 1.5 
Right turn 3.9 3.2 1.0 3.6 0.9 3.5 
Left turn 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.2 0.8 
Start up 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Backing 7.7 5.0 2.1 5.4 9.1 7.0 
Non-mirror-relevant 78.7 79.9 88.8 82.2 78.2 79.8 
Unknown 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 3.2 0.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 12 displays how light condition affects the ratio of right to left for these 
crash types. It appears that lower visibility significantly increases the difficulty of 
maneuvering safely to the right, as compared with the left. There are also interesting 
differences between the categories of light condition. (The dawn/dusk category includes 
only about three percent of involvements.) The dark condition increases the ratio of right 
to left LCM involvements by about 37 percent, compared with the daylight condition (4.1 
to 5.6). This increase is expected since it is likely that darkness in general degrades driver 
vision, particularly when using mirrors. However, note that in dark/lighted conditions, the 
ratio of right to left increases to 7.7, or by almost 88 percent, compared to the daylight 
condition. One interpretation of these results is that darkness exacerbates the problem of 
using the right-side mirror to determine if a maneuver to the right is safe, but that there 
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may be some help from the other vehicle’s headlamps. However in the dark/lighted 
condition, the roadside lights in essence wash out or mask the backscatter from the other 
vehicle’s headlamps, resulting in the significant increase in the ratio. The results are 
similar for right and left turn mirror-relevant crashes, and the interpretation would also be 
similar. 
Table 12  
Involvement Ratios of LCM and Turning Crashes by Light Condition  
TIFA/GES 1994-2000 




Dusk Unk. Total 
Ratio right-to-left 
lane change 4.1 7.7 5.6 9.5 1.2 4.4 
Ratio right-to-left 
turns 4.0 8.9 5.0 6.2 0.7 4.2 
 
Supplemental Data Collection on Selected Crash Types — Three crash types were 
identified for supplemental data collection. Each crash type was “mirror-relevant,” 
meaning that the conflict occurred in an area that the driver would have to use the mirror 
system to see. The three crash types were LCM right, right turn involving a pedestrian or 
other nonmotorist, and start up involving a pedestrian or other nonmotorist. Both the 
start up and right turn crash types involve low speed maneuvers, typically in urban areas, 
since they involve collisions with pedestrians or other nonmotorists. The LCM right 
crashes are primarily crashes on high-speed roads, usually involving two or more travel 
lanes in the same direction. 
LCM right crash involvements account for 6.8% of all truck involvements, which 
is a significant portion of the truck crash population and sufficient justification for 
selection for the more detailed case review. The start up and right turn crash 
involvements selected for review both are limited to those with pedestrians and other 
nonmotorists and account for a much lower proportion of the truck crash problem. For all 
crash severities, about 7.8 percent of truck involvements are collisions with nonmotorists.  
It is difficult to estimate with confidence the proportion of involvements covered 
by the nonmotorist crash types reviewed. In the crash typology developed for this project, 
the start up and right turn crash types account for about 10.0 percent of 
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truck/nonmotorist crash involvements, and 6.3 percent of fatal involvements, but both are 
likely underestimates. About 470 nonmotorists are killed annually in collisions with 
trucks, so those two crash types account for at least 30 fatalities per year. This figure is 
likely an underestimate. The mass crash data files have significantly less information 
about nonmotorists than they do about motor vehicles. In both the TIFA and the GES file, 
the crash type for most nonmotorist involvements is “hit object in road,” with the 
nonmotorist being the object. There is no further information about the movement of the 
nonmotorist, as there is for motor vehicles. So the tools available to specify nonmotorist 
crash types are limited.  
In addition, there has been limited research on truck/nonmotorist crashes so it is 
difficult to determine a better estimate. Retting, in a study of truck/pedestrian fatal 
crashes, found that 47.5 percent of truck/pedestrian occurred when the truck started from 
a stopped position (Retting 1993). Another 14.4 percent occurred in right turns by the 
truck.  Retting manually reviewed 202 fatal truck/pedestrians crash reports in four cities. 
Since he reviewed crashes only from four urban areas, it is not appropriate to extend 
those percentages to the whole population. Crash types are likely to be different in rural 
and suburban areas. The correct answer likely lies somewhere between the Retting 
finding and the proportions in the analysis here. 
The typology here is about as detailed as possible, using the information in the 
mass crash data. Given the limited information about pedestrian movements in the mass 
crash files, it would be necessary to do something like what Retting did, but in a 
nationally representative set of cases. In the scope of the current project, that is not 
possible. However, in both the start up and right turn crash types, the critical points occur 
in areas around the truck where the truck driver cannot see, either directly or by the use of 
mirrors. Therefore, in low speed maneuvers in urban areas with nonmotorists present, the 
onus of collision avoidance is of necessity on the nonmotorist. Improved vision in these 
areas would aid the driver in these situations, by giving him a chance of seeing the 
nonmotorist. Moreover, addressing the problem with nonmotorists in low speed 
maneuvers would likely help in other crash types that do not involve nonmotorists but 
where the conflict is in the same area. 
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The supplemental data were collected by reviewing police accident reports 
(PARs). UMTRI collects PARs as part of its TIFA program, and these PARs were used 
for the review. Since the cases were selected from the TIFA file, all the cases involve 
fatal crashes. All qualifying crashes from 1999 and 2000 (years for which TIFA can 
supply PARs) were taken. 
The primary purpose of the data collection was to determine the position of the 
other party at two points: three to five seconds before the collision and at the decision 
point for the truck driver. Note that all three crash types are those that the truck driver 
initiated by turning, changing lanes, or starting up. Accordingly, the positions of the other 
party prior to the maneuver and at the time when the driver decides to make the maneuver 
are important. Choosing three to five seconds as the position to code prior to the collision 
is somewhat arbitrary, but the combination of that position and the decision point does 
provide a view of the motion of the other party relative to the truck. 
The interface for the data collection is shown above in Error! Reference source 
not found.. The primary source for the information is the scene diagram, reporting 
officer’s narrative, and any witness statements included in the police report of the 
accident. These items are of course of varying quality, both within a state and between 
states. Some reports included fairly detailed crash reconstructions. Other reports are very 
sketchy, with little usable detail.  
The positions of the other party are of necessity estimates based on available 
information and deductions from the nature of the parties. An older pedestrian is assumed 
to move slowly, while bicyclists move more quickly. If overtaking speed is given in an 
LCM right crash, the position prior can be determined by tracking back from the impact 
point on the truck to where the other vehicle was prior to the crash. For example, a 10 
mph differential in travel speed implies a difference of 14.7 feet per second. If a truck is 
65 feet long and the impact point was the front right quarter of the tractor, the other 
vehicle would have been 44 to 73 feet behind the front of the tractor three to five seconds 
prior to impact. Where available, such information was taken into account, but for most 
cases coding is a best estimate. Missing data is high for some crash types. For the LCM 
right crash type, for example, it was not possible to estimate the prior position for 15 of 
the 40 cases. 
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Table 13 shows the distribution of truck configuration for the reviewed crash 
types. The dominant truck configurations are straight trucks and tractor-semitrailers. 
Straight trucks are somewhat overinvolved in these crashes: straight trucks account for 
28.2 percent of trucks in fatal truck crashes and tractor-semitrailers account for 59.6 
percent. But both types are well represented here, with 38.5 percent and 52.7 percent 
respectively. Even in the start up and turn right crash types, tractor-semitrailers account 
for almost half the involvements. 
Table 13 






nonmotorist Total Truck 
configuration N % N % N % N % 
Bobtail 2 5.0 2 5.3 4 5.7 8 5.4 
Straight truck 10 25.0 15 39.5 32 45.7 57 38.5 
Straight & 
trailer 1 2.5 4 10.5 0 0.0 5 3.4 
Tractor-
semitrailer 27 67.5 17 44.7 34 48.6 78 52.7 
Total 40 100.0 38 100.0 70 100.0 148 100.0 
 
To code the position of the other vehicle, the area around the truck was divided 
into a grid, and the other vehicle was placed in one of the cells. The position along the 
truck was divided into thirds, with the front third essentially encompassing the tractor or 
cab portion of a straight truck. The other vehicle was then located either in the lane to the 
right, the lane to the left, in front or to the rear of the truck. For start up and right turn 
crashes, the nonmotorist could be coded on the sidewalk or shoulder and areas were also 
included for parties more than 20 feet to the right. This area was also used in the case of 
LCM right crashes to locate vehicles that merged left as the truck merged right into the 
lane between them. It was also used in start up and right turn crashes to locate parties 
(usually bicyclists) that were moving on the road intersecting with the one the truck was 
on initially. 
Lane Change/Merge to Right — Figure 5 shows the position of the other vehicle 
three to five seconds prior to the collision. The position could not be estimated for 15 of 
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the 40 cases reviewed, so the rate of missing data is high. The percentages shown in the 
table were calculated after excluding the unknown cases. This procedure assumes that the 
true position for the missing cases follows the same distribution as those for which the  
position could be estimated. This seems a reasonable assumption, since there is no reason 
to think that vehicles in some positions would be less likely to be identified than those in 
other positions. 
 
Figure 5. Position of other vehicle 3-5 seconds prior to truck driver’s decision point, Lane Change/Merge to 
Right Crashes, N=40, TIFA 1999-2000.  Fifteen of 40 cases were excluded from the calculation of 
percentages because the position could not be determined. 
 
The number of cases in Figure 5 is small (40), but the cases include all LCM right 
fatal crash involvements for 1999 and 2000. Three more years, with potentially sixty 
more cases, are available but could not be reviewed within the constraints of time and 
funding. Also the additional years were subsequent to the period covered by the mass 
crash data analysis. Because the number of cases reviewed is small, confidence intervals 
for the proportions are relatively large. For example, the 95 percent confidence interval 
for the estimate that 32 percent of the other vehicles were to the front right of the cab is 
±18 percent. (Adding three more years of cases would cut the confidence intervals almost 
in half.)  
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The size of the confidence intervals is a concern. However, many of the findings 
discussed below are consistent with expectations and with experimental results. The 
experiments described in Section 3 of this report identified the front right of the truck as a 
concern. The fact that the results from crash analysis are consistent with the experimental 
finding boosts confidence the results reported here are real, even if confidence in the 
statistical sense is not high. 
Over half of the vehicles for which the prior position could be estimated were 
either along side the front of the truck or in front of the truck. A total of 40 percent of the 
other vehicles actually were along side the truck three to five seconds prior to the crash, 
and most of these were to the front. The vehicles coded directly to the front of the truck 
were being overtaken by the truck, which sideswiped them while maneuvering back into 
the lane. Only two cases were found in which the other vehicle was overtaking the truck 
rapidly on the right; and there was only one case (4 percent here) in which the other 
vehicle changed lanes left into the same space into which the truck was moving. In most 
of the LCM right  crashes, the conflict is to the immediate right of the truck or slightly in 
front. 
The position of the other vehicle at the decision point, that is the point at which 
the truck initiates the maneuver, was significantly easier to determine. The position at 
decision point could not be determined for only three of the 40 cases.  As shown in 
Figure 6, in almost half the cases (48.6 percent, ±16.1) the other vehicle was to the right 
of the cab at the decision point. An additional 21.6 percent were alongside the truck 
behind the cab. The cases coded in the lane next to the truck but still forward of the truck 
at the decision point included cases in which traffic suddenly slowed and the truck 
maneuvered unsuccessfully to avoid a collision and one case of reckless driving by the 
truck driver. However, the primary finding is that in these crashes the other vehicle is 
most frequently along side the front right of the truck when the driver decides to change 




Figure 6. Position of other vehicle at decision point, Lane Change/Merge to Right Crashes.  TIFA 1999-
2000, N=40.  Not applicable: 10.8%.  Three unknowns were excluded from percentage calculations. 
 
The position three to five seconds prior to the crash could not be determined for 
half of the cases that were next to the cab at the decision point, so whether those vehicles 
had been pacing along side the truck in its forward blind spot cannot be determined. 
However, for cases along side the cab at the decision point that could be located prior to 
the crash, all but one were along side the truck prior to the crash and the one exception 
was just forward of the truck. None were rapidly overtaking from the rear. 
Findings from the analysis of mass crash data reinforce the point. The TIFA data 
includes a variable that identifies the initial point of impact on the truck. Figure 7 is based 
on analysis of seven years of the TIFA file, not the case review. It shows the distribution 
of initial impact point on the truck in fatal crashes in which the truck was making a lane 
change or merging either to the right or left. (Nonfatal crash involvements could not be 
included because the GES file includes only the side of impact, not the location on the 
side.) The figures of the trucks are adapted from the coding manual used by FARS 
analysts to record the data. Both straight trucks and tractor-semitrailers are included in 
the data. It is important to remember that only the first contact point is recorded, so the 
movement of the other vehicle prior to impact is not reflected. Thus, we do not know if 
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the other vehicle was moving alongside the truck at a steady state or rapidly overtaking 
the truck. Nevertheless, the distribution of contact points is strikingly and suggestively 
different when the truck is moving left than when the truck is moving right. 
 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of initial impact on the truck in two crash types.  Fatal crashes only, Total N=200, 
TIFA 1994-2000. 
When the truck changed lanes or merged to the right, almost 48 percent of the 
contact points were in the cab area, compared with only 25.5 percent of left movements. 
And when moving right, an additional 13.0 percent were in the front of the truck, which 
is at least consistent with the scenario of the other vehicle moving at the same speed as 
the truck in the truck's forward blind zone. In total, over 60 percent of contact points on 
the truck in fatal crashes in which the truck changed lanes to the right occurred on the 
front of the truck, including the front plane and the right side of the cab. Proportionally 
fewer of the contact points on the truck in movements to the right were to the rear of the 
vehicle, with only 8.9 percent in the rear fifth of the truck. Contact points were more 
evenly distributed along the left of the vehicle in lane changes to the left, while in lane 
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changes to the right, contact occurred more frequently to the front of the vehicle. This 
suggests that, in lane changes to the left, the other vehicle more frequently was 
overtaking and contacted the truck at an essentially random point. But in lane changes to 
the right, about half the time the other vehicle was pacing alongside the truck to the right 
of the cab. 
Start Up Crashes — Start up crashes include all crashes in which the truck was 
starting from a stopped position on the roadway and collided with a pedestrian, bicyclist, 
or other nonmotorist. Most often the truck was stopped at an intersection and was the lead 
vehicle. The pedestrian crossed in front of the vehicle and was struck by the front of the 
truck as it started forward. This crash type also includes cases in which the truck was 
stopped on the roadway and a pedestrian attempted to cross between the truck and trailer. 
Note that start up crashes can include both pedestrians and bicyclists. Pedestrians are 
typically close to the vehicle prior to the crash, but bicyclists can be some distance away 
since they typically travel much faster than people on foot. 
Table 14 shows the relative motion of the other party prior to the crash. In most 
cases, the other party was crossing the intended path of the truck, most frequently from 
the right to the left, but sometimes from the truck’s left to its right. In six of the 38 cases 
reviewed, the other party was essentially stationary. In two of these, there had been a 
prior collision between the truck and another vehicle (of which the truck drivers were 
unaware) and the pedestrian was the other driver inspecting damage or calling for help. In 
another three instances, the pedestrian was a worker around the truck or a passenger who 
had exited the truck and was retrieving possessions from behind the cab. And in one case, 





Table 14  
Motion of Nonmotorist Relative to Truck, Start Up Crashes 
TIFA 1999-2000 
Nonmotorist Motion N % 
Crossing Right to Left 16 42.1 
Stationary 6 15.8 
Crossing Left to Right 5 13.2 
Same direction 1 2.6 
Unknown 10 26.3 
Total 38 100.0 
 
Figure 8 shows the position of the other party three to five seconds prior to the 
collision. The most frequent position is in front of the vehicle, typically older pedestrians 
moving slowly, but it is interesting to note the diversity of positions. In the cases 
immediately in front of the truck, it is likely that they were close enough to the truck to 
be hidden by the hood. In all cases where it was mentioned, the truck driver said he did 
not see the pedestrian prior to the collision, or did see the pedestrian (not in front of the 
truck) but assumed that the pedestrian had cleared the truck’s path. For example, in one 
crash the driver saw a 72-year old pedestrian attempting to cross in front. He waited until 
he thought the pedestrian had cleared, but the pedestrian had fainted and was struck as the 
truck pulled forward. But in most cases, the driver said that he never saw the other party, 
whether pedestrian or bicyclist.4 
                                                
4 The claim by the driver that he did not see the nonmotorist prior to the crash is of course self-protective. 
But the drivers who did not stop immediately continued normally after the crash, i.e., betrayed no 




Figure 8.  Position of nonmotorist 3-5 seconds prior to crash, Start Up Crashes, TIFA 1999-2000, N=38.  
Other (underneath truck): 3.7%. Unknowns account for 28.9% of the 38 cases and are excluded from the 
percentage calculations. 
 
At the decision point, in over half the cases the pedestrian or bicyclist was either 
to the left or right of the truck or directly in front of it (Figure 9).  In almost 58 percent of 
the crashes, the other party was directly in front of the vehicle. An additional 9.1 percent 
were in the lane to the right in front of the truck, and 9.1 percent were to the left. The 
cases coded behind the truck include two in which the pedestrian attempted to cross 
between the truck and trailer and one in which the pedestrian was a worker crushed when 
the truck rolled backward. Two cases coded at the side of the truck toward the rear or on 




Figure 9. Position of nonmotorist at truck decision point, Start Up Crashes, TIFA 1999-2000, N=38.  Other 
(underneath truck): 3.0%.   Position could not be coded for 13.2% of the 38 cases, and are excluded from 
the percentage calculations. 
 
As in the LCM right crash type, the number of cases available for review is small, 
resulting in relatively large confidence intervals. For example, the estimate that 57.6 
percent of the nonmotorists were directly in front of the truck at startup has a 95 percent 
confidence interval of ±16.9 percent. On the other hand, even with that large uncertainty, 
it is clear that directly in the front of the truck is the primary point of concern. 
Older pedestrians are overrepresented in truck start up crashes. Older pedestrians 
tend to move more slowly and take longer to clear the path of the truck. They also are 
less agile and less able to move out of the way of the truck when it starts unexpectedly. 
Figure 10 shows the distribution of pedestrian age in fatal crashes. Only pedestrians are 
included in the figure and separate distributions are shown for the start up crash type and 
all other crash types. Note that the distribution of pedestrian age is significantly shifted to 
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Figure 10.  Distribution of pedestrian age in fatal start up and other truck crashes.  TIFA 1994-2000. 
 
Table 15 is also restricted to pedestrians involved in truck crashes and compares 
the percentage of pedestrians in three age categories for start up and other truck crashes. 
In fatal truck start up crashes, fully 52.2 percent of pedestrians struck are over 65 years 
old, compared with only 16.5 percent of other truck/pedestrian crashes. Only 3.0 percent 
are under 17. It appears that older pedestrians are much more vulnerable to this crash type 
than other pedestrians. Given the fact that the truck driver is largely unable to view the 
immediate vicinity of the vehicle, in low speed maneuvers the burden of avoiding a 
collision is largely borne by the other parties around the truck. Populations that are less 
mobile are especially vulnerable. 
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Table 15  
Percentage Distribution of Age of Pedestrians in Start Up  
and Other Fatal Truck Crashes 
TIFA 1994-2000 
Crash type 
Pedestrian age Start up Other Total 
< 17 3.0 8.2 8.0 
17 to 65 43.3 74.4 73.5 
> 65 52.2 16.5 17.5 
Unknown 1.5 1.0 1.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 67 2,252 2,319 
 
Turn Right Crashes with Nonmotorists — Turn right crashes involving a truck 
making a right turn and colliding with a pedestrian or other nonmotorist actually occur in 
a variety of configurations. Seventy cases were reviewed. Figure 11 shows the most 
common configurations. In each diagram, the turning arrow represents the truck and the 
straight arrow represents the movement of the pedestrian, bicyclist, or in one case, a 
skater on rollerblades. The number of cases is shown for each configuration. 
 
 
Figure 11. Selected right turn/nonmotorist crash configurations, TIFA 1999-2000. 
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Most right turn/nonmotorist crashes occurred when the truck attempted a right 
turn and the pedestrian or nonmotorist went straight. Many of these crashes involved a 
bicycle, either in the lane next to the truck, or riding on the sidewalk next to the truck. 
Similarly, some of the crashes depicted in diagram B involved a bicycle riding along the 
side of the road against traffic, on the roadway onto which the truck was turning. 
Relatively few of the crashes involved off-tracking to the extent that the trailer axles 
encroached onto the sidewalk during the turn. Diagram D depicts one set, in which the 
pedestrians were stationary on the corner when struck by the trailer axles. The diagrams 
depicted in Figure 11 are the primary right turn/nonmotorist configurations identified in 
the case review. 
While the number of crashes in which the trailer axles off-tracked up onto the 
curb and sidewalk is relatively small, off-tracking even when the axles stayed in the road 
was a factor in many of these accidents. For example, in one case an older woman was 
crossing the road onto which the truck was turning. The driver stopped to allow the 
woman to pass in front and waited until he thought she should have made it to the curb. 
He checked his mirror, did not see the woman, and proceeded. But the woman had 
paused in the road, and when the truck moved forward, the trailer swung into her, 
knocked her down, and she was struck by the rear axles. 
In a similar case, but a different configuration, an older pedestrian intended to 
cross the street, as in diagram B in Figure 11. The truck pulled forward to make the turn 
and in fact swung wide to avoid off-tracking onto the curb. The pedestrian stepped out 
into the street anticipating the truck clearing, but was taken by surprise as the trailer 
swung toward him as the truck completed the turn. He attempted to get out of the way, 
but stumbled and was struck. 
Figure 12 shows the position of the nonmotorist prior to the decision point in right 
turn fatal truck crashes. The position could not be determined in 12 of the 70 cases 
reviewed, or 17.1 percent. Cases coded unknown on prior position are excluded when 
calculating percentages. About 43 percent of the nonmotorists were on the sidewalk next 
to the truck prior to the turn. Most of these are about level with the cab or somewhat in 
front of the cab. The cases coded more than 20 feet to the right are typically bicyclists 
either on the sidewalk (3.4 percent here) or riding along the curb against traffic in the 
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roadway (8.6 percent). Another 8.6 percent were on the sidewalk but behind the truck. 
These cases were bicyclists riding on the sidewalk and overtaking the truck. 
 
 
Figure 12. Position of nonmotorist 3-5 seconds prior to decision point, Turn Right/Nonmotorist Crashes, 
TIFA 1999-2000, N=70.  Twelve of 70 cases are excluded from calculation of percentages because the 
position could not be coded. 
 
About a quarter of the cases coded in the lane next to the truck were bicyclists. 
The ones behind the truck were overtaking it, while the ones next to the cab or slightly 
ahead were typically stopped next to the truck, waiting for the traffic signal to change and 
intending to proceed straight ahead. In virtually all cases, the truck driver reported not 
seeing the bicyclist. In one such case, a man and a woman on bicycles had stopped next 
to a concrete mixer, with the man in the lead. When the light changed, the truck started 
forward to turn but paused to allow the man to clear. The driver did not see the following 
woman, who collided with the side of the truck as it executed the turn. 
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Figure 13 shows the position of the nonmotorist at the decision point for the truck. 
This is the point at which the driver initiated the turn. A third of the nonmotorists for 
whom this position could be estimated were on the sidewalk or shoulder and even with 
the cab of the truck. While a few were struck when the truck off-tracked up onto the 
sidewalk or shoulder, in most cases the nonmotorist proceeded into the street where they 
were struck. Only 14.8 percent were estimated to be just in front of the truck at turn 
initiation. Almost 20 percent were in the road and slightly ahead of the truck, but likely 
still in the forward blind zone. 
 
 
Figure 13. Position of nonmotorist at truck driver’s decision point, Turn Right/Nonmotorist Crashes, TIFA 
1999-2000, N=70.  One case was not applicable (driver lost control due to a medical emergency).  Sixteen 
of 70 cases were excluded from the calculation of percentages because the position could not be coded. 
 
As in start up crashes, older pedestrians are significantly overrepresented in right 
turn truck fatal crashes. Almost 42 percent of pedestrians struck in right turn crashes 
were over 65, compared with only 17.0 percent of pedestrians struck in other crash types. 
From the review of the events of specific crashes it appears that some are similar to start 
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up crashes, in that the older pedestrians proceeded more slowly than other pedestrians 
and the driver’s vision was blocked by the hood. But many were related to off-tracking, 
even when the truck stayed entirely in the road. In these crashes, the pedestrian stepped 
into the street as the truck started forward, anticipating the truck’s movement. But they 
were taken by surprise when the trailer axles tracked inboard of the tractor, and were 
unable to move out of the way. It appears that the truck driver had no way to see the 
crucial areas while making the turn and so had no idea that there was a problem until 
after the event, either by sensing a thump as the wheels passed over the pedestrian or 
when alerted by others that an accident had occurred. 
Table 16  
Percentage Distribution of Age of Pedestrians in Right Turn  
and Other Fatal Truck Crashes 
TIFA 1999-2000 
Crash type 
Pedestrian age Right turn Other Total 
< 17 4.7 8.1 8.0 
17 to 65 53.5 73.9 73.5 
> 65 41.9 17.0 17.5 
Unknown 0.0 1.0 1.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N 43 2,276 2,319 
 
2.3 Summary and Discussion 
Mirror-relevant crashes account for almost 20 percent of all crash involvements. 
That is, crashes in which the truck driver needed to use mirrors to maneuver safely 
accounted for about one in five truck crash involvements. In most of the mirror-relevant 
crash types, the crashes involved relatively low closing speeds, either because the truck 
was moving slowly, as in start up and the turning crashes, or because both vehicles were 
moving in the same direction on the same roadway and the truck maneuvered into the 
other vehicle, as in the lane change crashes. In these crashes, the conflict was close to the 
truck and the driver had to rely on the truck mirrors to determine where the other vehicle 
or nonmotorist was. 
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Truck crashes in which the driver must rely on mirrors to move the right are 
significantly overrepresented in comparison with left moves. LCM right crashes occurred 
over four times more frequently than LCM left crashes. Similarly, turn at intersection 
crashes (turn right crashes) in which the conflict comes from the rear are over four times 
more frequent in right turns than in left. The distance from the driver to the right-side 
mirror and the relatively smaller image in the mirror makes maneuvers to the right more 
risky than similar maneuvers to the left. 
Given the over-representation of mirror-relevant crashes to the right, it was 
hypothesized that factors that might further obscure the image would affect the relative 
frequency. Darkness and weather were both considered. Weather condition was used as a 
surrogate for splash and spray that may coat the mirrors and obscure the image. Only a 
relatively small effect was found. When there was precipitation, the over-representation 
of right to left LCM crashes increased by about 10 percent. But in turns at intersection, 
the ratio of right to left actually decreased by about 10 percent. Possibly splash and spray 
on the mirrors is not a problem or if it is, it is relative small. 
Light condition, however, plays a larger and consistent role. Darkness increased 
the right/left ratio for LCM crashes by about 37 percent. The dark/lighted condition 
further increased the relative frequency of lane changes to the right. Apparently darkness 
obscured the view, and when there were streetlights, those lights washed out reflectance 
from the headlamps of the other vehicle, making it very difficult for the truck driver to 
detect other vehicles to the right. 
Supplemental data on selected crash types reinforced the findings from the 
analysis of the computerized crash files, and identified the right front as a significant 
problem area. A sample of police reports on fatal crashes were reviewed for three types: 
LCM right, start up, and right turn. 
In LCM right crashes, the area to the right of the cab or just in front appeared to 
be a significant problem. In over half of the crashes reviewed, the other party was in that 
area three to five seconds prior to the collision. And in almost half of the collisions, the 
other vehicle was to the front right of the truck’s cab when the truck driver initiated the 
move to the right. Identification of front right as major area of concern is reinforced in 
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the mass crash data by the findings on the initial impact point. Where the LCM was to the 
right, there was a concentration at the front of the vehicle with almost 61 percent of the 
impacts. In contrast, where the LCM was to the left, impact point distribution was 
bimodal, with about 25 percent to the front left, about 25 percent to the rear left and the 
remainder distributed in between. 
In start up crashes where the other party was a pedestrian and was struck by the 
front, it is likely that in most cases the driver’s view was obstructed by the hood. Most 
drivers said they never saw the pedestrian, while some drivers said they saw the 
pedestrian crossing and paused until they thought the pedestrian had cleared. For most 
pedestrian start up crashes, the pedestrian was either in front of or near the front of the 
truck three to five seconds prior to the collision. Almost 60 percent were in front of the 
truck at the decision point, and an additional 18.2 percent were either immediately to the 
left or right of the front of the truck. In the remainder, the pedestrian was behind the truck 
and it rolled back, or the pedestrian was attempting to cross between the truck and trailer. 
Clearly the primary zone is immediately in front of the truck. 
Older pedestrians were significantly overrepresented in start up crashes. Over half 
of the pedestrians struck were over 65, compared with only 16.5% for other types of 
truck/pedestrian fatal crashes. In many of the collisions with older pedestrians, their 
shorter stature and slower foot speed were factors mentioned in the police reports. The 
truck drivers who saw the pedestrian prior to the collision waited until they thought it was 
safe to proceed. But without cross-view mirrors, the driver has no way of seeing the area 
in front of the vehicle, so the burden of crash avoidance falls largely on the pedestrians. 
Right turn crashes are more complex, and involved off-tracking as well as blind 
spots. When the crashes involved bicyclists stopped alongside the truck in the street, the 
driver frequently stated that he could not see them. These crashes were like start up 
crashes in that typically the bicyclist was waiting along side the truck, unseen by the 
driver, and when the truck started forward, the bicyclist did also and was struck when the 
truck turned. In most cases in which the bicyclist was initially on the sidewalk, the 
bicyclist attempted to cross in front of the truck without stopping.  In all such cases, the 
truck driver reported not having seen the bicyclist prior to making the turn.  
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There were a few cases of classic off-tracking, in which the trailer or truck rear 
axles mounted the curb and encroached on the sidewalk or shoulder. But much more 
common were collisions in which the truck initiated its turn—in some cases swinging 
wide so as to avoid running up on the curb—and the pedestrian stepped out into the 
street, anticipating the truck clearing out. But when the trailer swung toward them as the 
trailer axles tracked inboard of the tractor path, the pedestrian was unable to get out of the 
way in time and was struck. Older pedestrians were also over-represented in right turn 
crashes, with pedestrians over 65 accounting for almost 42 percent of the involvements, 
compared with 17 percent of other crash types. 
In sum, the area to the right of the truck, particularly right forward, is clearly 
significantly overrepresented in certain crash types. In lane change crashes, movement to 
the right is overrepresented by over four times compared to movement to the left, and the 
problem is exacerbated at night and in dark/lighted conditions. In low speed maneuvers 
involving pedestrians and other nonmotorists, the fact that the truck driver is largely 
unable to view the immediate vicinity of the vehicle places the burden of avoiding a 
collision largely on the other parties around the truck. Populations that are less mobile are 





3.0 EMPIRICAL TEST OF MIRROR SYSTEMS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section, we describe a pilot experiment that was designed to quantify the 
difficulty of a driver’s visual scanning task for various locations around a heavy truck and 
for different mirror systems.  The purpose of this experiment was to develop a method 
and to provide preliminary data on visual difficulty.   
The method was implemented in a static, parking lot setting, but it is intended to 
be extendable to fully dynamic driving situations in actual traffic.  Making this extension 
will require further work, and presumably will require some modifications of the 
procedure. 
Crash data, described in Section 2 of this report, provide one source of 
information about the areas in which a driver experiences visual difficulty.  The right side 
appears to present more of a problem than the left, and this difference appears to be 
higher at night than during the day.  Data from the current experiment can be compared 
to the findings from the crash data.  This approach will allow us to develop a model of 
visual difficulty to account for the major findings in the crash data, and, more importantly 
for practical considerations, make valid predictions about the efficacy of various 





An outdoor, parking lot situation was used to simulate statically the most 
important visual circumstances that a driver would be presented with in traffic that is 
moving at a common speed on a multilane road.  
Subjects — Six professional truck drivers were paid to participate in the study.  
All were male and ranged in age from 39 to 63, with an average age of 51.8 years.  
Gender and age were not explicitly selected in determining the sample.  Subjects were 
recruited through e-mail messages that were sent to truck drivers in the southeast 
Michigan area who were members of the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers 
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Association (OOIDA).  By self-report, the subjects ranged in years of professional 
driving experience from 5 to 45, with an average of 17.2 years. 
Vehicles — Two vehicles were used:  a tractor-trailer and a passenger car.  The 
tractor-trailer consisted of an International tractor and an UMTRI box trailer.  As shown 
in Error! Reference source not found., the entire combination was 19.5 m (64 ft) long.  
The trailer itself was 13.7 m (45 ft) long.  The passenger car was a 1993 Nissan Altima.   
Mirrors and Fields of View — Three mirrors were mounted on each side of the 
tractor:  a flat (west coast) mirror, a window-mounted convex mirror, and a fender-
mounted convex mirror.  All mirrors were left in place throughout the experiment, but 
black covers were placed over one or the other of the convex mirrors during blocks of 
trials when they were not to be used.  The mirrors were aimed using the guidelines 
developed by Liberty Mutual (1998).  The convex mirrors were aimed for a typical 
driver’s eye position and were not reaimed for individual drivers.  This proved to be 
satisfactory for all drivers, primarily because of the wide fields of view of those mirrors.  
The west coast mirrors were reaimed for each driver.  The visibility of the passenger car 
in the fields of view of the three mirrors is characterized in Table 17, and the fields of 




Visibility of the Passenger Car in the Three Rearview Mirrors, Right Side  
(empty cell = no visibility, x = partial visibility, xx = full visibility) 
Mirror Distance aft of 
Front Bumper 





0  x xx 
1  x xx 
3  x xx 
5  x xx 
10  xx xx 
15 x xx xx 
20 xx xx xx 
25 xx xx xx 
30 xx xx xx 
35 xx xx xx 
 
 
Field Setup — The study was conducted in a flat, open area of the UMTRI 
parking lot.  The setup is diagrammed in Figure 14.  The tractor-trailer was parked at one 
end of the area, so that the passenger car could be placed in a variety of positions 
alongside or behind it.  Using visual reference marks that were not visible from the cab of 
the tractor-trailer, the car could be placed at 0, 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, or 35 m behind 
the tractor-trailer (measured from the front of the tractor to the front of the car).  The car 
could be one lane to the left, one lane to the right, or two lanes to the right of the tractor-
trailer.  Lanes were 3.7 m (12 ft) wide.  The parking lot was equipped with fixed lighting, 
















Figure 14. The field setup, showing the position of the tractor-trailer and the potential positions of the 
passenger car one lane to the left (similar positions could be occupied in the first or second lane to the right 
of the tractor-trailer).  Approximate mirror fields of view are shown for the planar mirrors (green), door-
mounted convex (blue) and fender-mounted convex (orange) on the ground plane (solid lines) and 1.2-m 
plane (dotted lines).  The colored bars to the right show the approximate visibility of the target vehicle in 
each of the right-side mirrors as a function of distance aft of the front bumper.  For example, the vehicle 




Procedure — Each subject participated individually.  For each subject, there were 
two sessions, each about two hours long.  The first was always a day session and the 
second was a night session.  At the beginning of the first session, each subject filled out a 
brief questionnaire about his professional driving experience and use of rearview mirrors 
on heavy trucks.  He was also given a vision test.  He was then seated in the tractor-trailer 
and the west coast mirrors were aimed.  
The procedure was the same for the night and day sessions.  For the night 
sessions, all fixed lighting was turned off before the session began.  During each session, 
8 blocks of trials were run.  Each trial began with the driver looking at a designated point 
inside the cab.  This allowed the passenger car to be moved into position without the 
subject seeing it.  During nighttime sessions, the car was moved into position with the 
headlamps off so that the subject could not sense the position of the car by direct or 
reflected light from the headlamps.  The headlamps were turned on after the car was in 
position.  So that the headlamps would not make it possible to discern the location of the 
car after they were turned on, different visual fixation points were used for the day and 
night sessions.  During daytime sessions, the subject looked at a small indicator lamp on 
the lower part of the instrument panel, below the steering wheel.  During nighttime 
sessions, the subject looked at a position on either the right or left interior of the cab 
(opposite the side on which the car might be positioned for that trial). At the end of each 
session, the subject completed a short debriefing questionnaire.  At the beginning of each 
trial, an experimenter in the rear of the cab warned the subject that a trial was about to 
begin.   
The experimenter then initiated a trial by pressing a button on a computer that 
kept track of trials and collected responses from the subject.  The computer than either 
turned on the indicator light (during daytime sessions) or made an audible signal (during 
nighttime sessions).  These signals indicated to the subject that he should look to a 
predesignated side of the truck (right or left), and, using any combination of direct and 
mirror fields of view, determine whether the car was present on that side in a location that 
would be in conflict with a lane change to that side.  He was to make that determination 
as quickly as possible and indicate his decision by pushing one of two buttons on a small 
hand-held box: one marked “Go” (indicating that the car was either not present, or was 
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present in a position that did not conflict with a lane change), and one marked “No go” 
(indicating that the car was present and in a position that conflicted with a lane change).  
The computer recorded which button was pushed, and the time between the signal to the 
subject (the indicator light or audible signal) and the button push. 
During each block, the car, if present, was always on the same side of the truck.  
The subject was therefore always aware of which side to look to on each trial.  During 
each of the first 6 blocks, the car, if present, was always either one lane to the left or right 
of the truck.  The first six blocks each consisted of 15 trials, including 5 on which the car 
was not present and 10 on which the car was present at each of the longitudinal positions 
(0, 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, or 35 m).  The seventh and eighth blocks each consisted of 
12 trials, including 4 on which the car was not present and 8 on which the car was present 
at each of four longitudinal positions (5, 15, 25, or 35 m) one or two lanes to the right of 
the truck.  On trials when the car was not present, it was positioned in the blind zone 
behind the truck so that it would not be visible to the subject in any direct or mirror field 
of view.  Within each block, the order of trials was randomized so that the subject could 
not predict whether the car would be present, or in what position it might appear. 
It was left to the subject’s judgment to decide whether the car was in a position 
that would be in conflict with a lane change.  This was true for both longitudinal position 
(in all blocks of trials) and lane position (in the last two blocks of each session, during 
which the car might be either one or two lanes to the right). 
The availability of mirrors was changed between blocks of trials, and remained 
fixed within each block of trials.  For each session, the first six blocks of trials included 
the following three sets of available mirrors, once on each side: (1) flat, window-mounted 
convex, and fender-mounted convex; (2) flat and window-mounted convex; (3) flat and 
fender-mounted convex.  For each session, the seventh and eighth blocks included the 
following two sets of mirrors: (1) flat, window-mounted convex, and fender-mounted 




3.2 Results and Discussion 
Results are reported in terms of response type and then reaction time.  Finally, we 
discuss the relationship between response type (coded as correct or incorrect) and 
reaction time. 
Proportion “go” responses — The proportion of “go” responses is shown in 
Figure 15 as a function of distance behind the front of the tractor-trailer, for the left and 
right sides.  There were very few go responses for positions within the first 20 m, as 
might be expected because there was overlap between the vehicles for all positions back 
to 15 m, and there was so little clearance at 20 m (see Figure 15) that many people would 
consider “no go” to be the correct response for that position as well.  There are a few go 
responses at very short distances, but only on the right side.  All go responses at short 
distances can be considered mistakes, because the passenger car was clearly in conflict 
with a lane change by the tractor-trailer when it was in those positions. 
The same data are shown in Figure 16 broken down by night and day.  The 
increase in go responses with distance is shifted to higher distances at night, as if drivers 
were more conservative at night, perhaps because the task was more difficult in the more 
limited viewing conditions of nighttime. Figure 16 shows that the go responses at the 
very short distances occur primarily at night.   
 
 






Figure 16.  Proportion “go” responses by light condition and distance of the target passenger car.  Right and 
left sides combined. 
 
Figure 17 shows the data for the right side only to emphasize the effects on that 
side.  It is clear that the go responses at very short distances are primarily limited to the 
night condition on the right side.  That combination of conditions could be expected to be 
the most difficult, given that direct views out the window are more limited on the right 
side, and that partial visibility of the passenger car, near the edge of the window-mounted 
convex mirror, may be less useful in the limited viewing conditions of nighttime.   
Figure 18 shows a breakdown of responses by side and time of day 
simultaneously.  This view of the data makes it clear that the go responses at short 
distances are in fact primarily limited to the right side at night.  This corresponds well to 
the crash data, which indicate that crashes are overrepresented for the same combination 
of conditions. Figure 18 also illustrates that the tendency to shift go responses to higher 
distances that is evident in Figure 15 and Figure 16 is mostly restricted to the 
combination of right side and night.  Because this could be considered conservative 
behavior, it would not be expected to lead to more crashes if it were happening in actual 
driving, but it is also consistent with the hypothesis that there is an interaction of the 
difficulties that drivers experience in seeing to the right and the reduction in visibility 
caused by night conditions, such that the combination of right side and night is 
particularly difficult. 




Figure 17. Proportion “go” responses by light condition and distance of the target passenger car.  Right-side 
data only. 
 
Figure 18.  Proportion go responses by distance for each combination of side and light condition. 
Although it was left to the subjects to decide which positions of the passenger car 
were in conflict with a lane change by the tractor-trailer, some patterns in the data are 
best illustrated by imposing a rule that allows us to classify responses as right or wrong.  
First, it is reasonably clear that all go responses at distances less than 20 m should be 
considered errors.  A distance of 20 m is more ambiguous, but certainly lane change 
maneuvers in that configuration would be risky by many drivers.  Error! Reference 
source not found. shows responses coded as error rates, using the assumption that no go 
is the correct response at all distances of 20 m or less, and that go is correct at all 
distances of 25 m or more.  Using that assumption, the error rates at 25 m are particularly 
high, and it might be argued that the criterion for the no go response should be pushed 
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back to 30 m.  However, the patterns of errors highlighted by this analysis, and which we 
will relate to reaction time data below, would not be critically different if the criterion 
were shifted to 30 m. 
Figure 19 illustrates and highlights several aspects of the subjects’ responses that 
can be considered errors.  First, there are errors on the right side at night at short 
distances.  Second, there are many nominal errors when the passenger car is just behind 
the end of the trailer, a circumstance that perhaps should be viewed mainly as an 
indication of the ambiguity of those situations.  Third, whatever distance is used as the 
criterion for when there is enough clearance to allow a lane change, there will be a 
particularly large number of trials on the right at night that can be considered errors in a 
conservative direction.   
 
 
Figure 19.  Responses recoded as error rates, based on 25 m as the criterion for adequate separation for a 
lane change. 
Figure 20 shows the error rates in Figure 19 referenced to the condition with the 
fewest nominal errors (the left side in the daytime).  This emphasizes the relative 
difficulty of the various conditions, showing the previously noted pattern in which the 





Figure 20. Error rates referenced to the left-day condition. 
 
Figure 21 shows a summary of responses from the blocks of trials in which the 
passenger car could appear either one or two lanes to the right of the tractor-trailer.  In 
those blocks, subjects had to decide not only whether the passenger car was clear of the 
rear end of the trailer, but which lane it was in.  For the most part, they could decide the 
lane location reliably.  The proportions of cases in which the car was two lanes to the 
right but subjects indicated no go may be attributable to conservative decision making, to 
avoid a possible conflict with a car that might itself change lanes, rather than to a 
misperception of which lane the car was in.  Lane location and distance to the rear clearly 
interact in the final decisions made by these subjects, but the extent to which this pattern 
reflects their intended strategy (or a normative strategy) and the extent to which it reflects 
any errors in their perceptions of the location of the passenger car are difficult to separate 





Figure 21.  Proportion “go” responses by lane and distance of the target passenger car, for trials in the 
blocks using two lanes to the right of the truck (R indicates one lane to the right, RR indicates two lanes to 
the right). 
Reaction Time — Figure 22 shows reaction times for each distance on the left and 
right sides.  The times were mostly between 1 and 2 seconds—on the slow side but not 
out of line with decisions that drivers may make in real traffic when anticipating a lane 
change.  Reaction times are consistently higher on the right side, and the difference is 
particularly large for the very short distances, at which there were a substantial number of 
trials that can be considered errors.  There also appears to be a rise in reaction times when 
the passenger car is near the end of the trailer (about 20 m).  The extra time is presumably 
associated with the need to make finer discriminations, or perhaps to take into account 
strategic considerations, when the clearance with the end of the trailer is marginal. 
Figure 23 shows the reaction time data further broken down by time of day.  As 
might be expected on the basis of the results for response type and errors, the high 
reaction times for short distances on the right side are particularly high at night.  
Interestingly, there is not a general increase of reaction times at night.  Rather, the 
increase at night appears to be limited to the short distances on the right.  However, 
interpretations of the overall effect of night versus day have to be considered tentative, 
given that in the design of this study all subjects completed the day condition before the 
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night condition.  Practice effects could therefore be expected to cause a general 
improvement in the night condition. 
Figure 24 shows reaction times referenced to the condition that had the shortest 
reaction times (and the lowest error rates, as shown in Figure 20). This highlights the 
relative difficulty of the various conditions.  As with the error rates, it indicates that the 
combination of the right side and nighttime is particularly difficult.  The right side during 
the day is also difficult by the reaction time measure.  At least in terms of reaction time, 
the left side at night is not much more difficult than during the day.   
 
 
Figure 22. Reaction time by side and distance of the target passenger car. 
 






Figure 24.  Reaction times referenced to the left-day condition. 
 
Figure 25 shows the relationship between reaction times and error rates (as shown 
in Figure 19) for all combinations of side and distance.  There is a clear positive 
relationship, with the conditions that lead to more errors also requiring the longest 
reaction times.  This relationship makes interpretation of both the reaction time and error 
rate results relatively straightforward, because both measures lead to similar conclusions.  
The opposite relationship, a tradeoff between reaction time and error rate, is sometimes 
observed and is usually considered an indication of relatively complex strategic effects on 
the part of subjects.   
Figure 26 shows the relationship between reaction time and error rates for the 
three different mirror conditions.  The best performance, in terms of both speed and 
accuracy (at least as quantified here) was for the innovative condition in which there was 
a fender-mounted convex mirror, but no window-mounted convex mirror.  Although 
these pilot data cannot be considered conclusive, the favorable results for this condition 
suggest that the possibility of substituting a fender-mounted convex mirror for the 





Figure 25. The relationship between reaction time and error rate for the 20 combinations of side (L/R) and 




Figure 26. Speed and accuracy by mirror condition.  For right, night, and distances of 5 m and lower. 
 
Figure 27 shows a histogram of responses to a question about the overall value of 




Figure 27. Ratings of the value of fender-mounted mirrors by the six subjects (10 is better).   
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The empirical results for driver visual performance are consistent with the crash 
data described in Section 2.  There appears to be converging evidence for a visibility 
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problem on the right side, toward the front of tractor-trailers.  Preliminary results for 
three different mirror systems are not conclusive, but suggest that the best visual 
performance may result from an innovative system in which a fender-mounted convex is 








4.0 PRIORITIZATION OF ZONES FOR DRIVER VISION IMPROVEMENT 
 
4.1 Zone Definition and Rationale 
One objective of this study was to determine which aspects of driver vision most required 
improvement.  Based on the crash data results presented in Section 2, and the supporting 
findings from the pilot study of driver performance presented in Section 3, a set of four 
plan-view zones has been developed and prioritized.  Figure 28 presents these zones, 
which lie forward, rearward, and to the right of the truck. 
 
Figure 28.  Prioritized zones for driver vision improvement.  The highest priority zone is indicated with 
numeral 1. 
Priority 1 (highest): The area immediately to the right of the cab, extending to the 
far side of the adjacent lane and 5 m rearward from the front bumper. 
The crash analysis presented in Section 2 shows that the area immediately to the right of 
the cab is the area of highest concern.  This is the most common location for contact with 
another vehicle during truck-initiated lane-change/merge crashes.  This zone also 
encompasses the most common initial (pre-maneuver) positions for non-motorists struck 
during start-up and right-turn crashes.  In the pilot study (Section 3), drivers took the 
longest to detect lane-change conflicts in this area.  The geometric analysis of direct and 
indirect fields of view for an exemplar cab showed that a small vehicle in this location 
could be completely obstructed from direct view and not visible with door-mounted 
mirrors.  The driver’s only view of objects in this area was provided by the fender-
mounted convex mirror.   
Priority 2 (second highest):  The area immediately to the right of the truck, 
extending to the far side of the adjacent lane, beginning 5 m from the front bumper 
and extending to a line 5-m rearward of the back of the truck (including trailer).    
Right-going, truck-initiated lane-change/merge crashes are approximately 4.5 times more 
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likely than left-going crashes.   Even after accounting for the substantial percentage of 
these crashes in which the struck vehicle is in zone 1 immediately prior to the truck-
initiated maneuver, the area adjacent to the right side  of the truck and extending one car-
length behind the back of the truck remains a high priority.   Although vehicles that are 
centered in the adjacent lane in this zone are usually partially or wholly visible in the 
door-mounted planar mirror, the door-mounted convex mirror is the only means most 
drivers have to view the entirety of the zone.  The difference in response times between 
the left and right sides in the area rearward of the cab (see section 3) suggests that the 
combination of mirrors available on the right side is less effective than the mirrors on the 
left side. 
Priority 3 (third highest): The area immediately behind the truck.   The crash 
analysis in Section 2 shows that backing crashes are the most common type of truck-
initiated crash.  The data used in this analysis were limited to crashes that occur on a 
public motorway, so the actual number of backing crashes would probably be 
considerably higher if crashes that occurred on private property (parking lots, loading 
docks, shipping terminals, etc.) were included.  Backing crashes have recently been 
addressed by NHTSA in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that outlines changes to 
FMVSS 111 that would require an indirect vision system covering the area immediately 
behind certain straight trucks (NHTSA 2005).  NHTSA estimated that about 13 on-road 
fatalities each year are caused by backing crashes, whereas approximately 66 off-road 
fatalities in backing crashes occur during the same time period.  Because backing crashes 
tend to occur at low speeds, the fatalities are mostly non-motorists. 
Priority 4 (fourth highest): The area immediately in front and to the right-front of 
the truck, extending through the truck’s lane across the right adjacent lane and 
extending 5 m forward of the front bumper.    Start-up and right-turn crashes account 
for perhaps 40 to 60 on-road non-motorist fatalities in the U.S. each year.  In most of 
these cases, the pedestrian or cyclist is in front of or to the right front of the cab 
immediately prior to the event (i.e., in zones 1 or 4).   Crashes into non-motorists initially 
located in zone 4 are those most likely affected by direct vision obstructions, since few 
U.S. trucks have mirrors covering this zone.   Methods to assess visibility in zones 1 and 




As noted above, these zones are intended to prioritize improvements to driver vision 
above the current de-facto standard, i.e., door-mounted planar and convex mirrors on 
both sides of the cab.   The lack of inclusion of a particular area (say, the left-front of the 
cab) in these zones should not be interpreted as implying either that the driver vision in 
those areas would not benefit from improvement, nor that decrements in vision in those 
areas would be acceptable.  For example, expanding the width of the direct-vision 
obstruction posed by the driver-side A-pillar would not be desirable, but the current 
analysis is not able to estimate the safety effect of such a change. 
The vision zones described above are defined only in plan view.  Because the potential 
crash partners in these areas typically have a vertical extent of a meter or more, 
suggesting that the primary plane of interest may not be the ground.  Section 5 addresses 
the issue of the relevant target height.  
The vision zones described above span only areas relatively close to the vehicle. Some 
crashes due to limitations of driver direct indirect vision involve partners who are outside 
of the priority zones when the truck driver begins the maneuver, but the importance of 
driver vision in such crashes is difficult to quantify from crash data.  Hence, the data do 
not provide a good justification for making A-pillar obstructions (or direct-vision 
obstructions due to mirrors) a high priority, except as they affect visibility of targets 
located within 5 m of the vehicle. 
The vision zones prioritization implicitly addresses the relative importance of 
improvements in direct and indirect vision.  The top three priority areas are areas with 
minimal or no direct visibility, meaning that improvements to driver vision in these areas 
will come through improvements in indirect vision systems.  Vision zone 4, directly in 
front of the truck, may be addressed on some vehicles through improvements in direct 
vision (changes in the hood design, for example) but other trucks will require an indirect 
vision component (e.g., a front cross-view mirror) to improve driver vision in this zone.  
The highest priority zone directly to the right of the cab is already addressed on the 
majority of trucks by a convex mirror mounted on the hood or fender near the front of the 
truck.  However, even with a mirror in this location, drivers’ reaction times with targets 
in zone 1 are still longer than for targets in the equivalent location on the left side of the 
truck.  This suggests that vision improvement above that provided by the fender-mounted 






5.0 A METHOD FOR EVALUATING NEAR-CAB VISIBILITY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The crash data analysis in Section 2 demonstrated that crashes due to limitations 
of driver vision occur most frequently in the areas directly behind the vehicle, along the 
right side of the vehicle, particularly adjacent to the cab, and immediately forward of the 
cab.  The experimental study reported in Section 3 demonstrated that the time required 
for drivers to detect a lane-change conflict was greatest immediately to the right of the 
cab.   Section 4 presented a set of zones, ordered by priority, in which improvements in 
driver vision could yield safety improvements.    
Driver vision can be improved in a variety of ways.  The preferred approach 
should always be to provide direct vision of the area of interest.  If direct vision is not 
feasible, then a high-quality view of the area should be provided by an indirect vision 
system.  The quality of the view afforded by an indirect vision system is difficult to 
quantify meaningfully, but the methods used in the pilot study provide a potential 
performance-based approach.  That is, the relative amount of time required to determine 
the presence or absence of a conflict might be a useful measure of the relative quality of 
the view.  In the pilot study, the target was a vehicle, but a pedestrian or pedal cyclist 
might provide a more rigorous test of an indirect vision system, particularly for targets 
relatively far rearward along the vehicle or close to the cab.  
Two standardized methods are currently available for comparing the driver vision 
provided by alternative cab designs.  SAE J1750 presents two methods for generating 
graphical depictions of the visual field by raytracing from an eye point, usually the 
centroid of the J941 cyclopean eyellipse.  The polar plot depicts vision obstructions due 
to the cab, mirrors, and other vehicle structures in angle (azimuth, elevation) space.  The 
horizontal projection plot shows the visible and obstructed areas on a horizontal plane, 





Figure 29. Sample horizontal projection plot from SAE J1750. 
 
The J1750 visibility plots, and other graphical depictions of driver visibility, are 
valuable for comparing among vehicles.  However, the SAE Recommended Practices do 
not provide guidance on the importance of improvements in the size of the visible field.  
Intuitively, the importance of a particular increase or decrease in the field of view 
depends on the area that is obstructed or revealed.  A decrement in visibility in one area 
may have no meaningful safety effect, whereas a decrement in another area may have an 
important effect.    
This report section presents a calculation procedure for evaluating of the relative 
safety of alternative truck cab designs with respect to near-cab visibility.  The method is 
based on the following observations: 
• The primary safety problem in the area affected by obscuration caused by the 
hood and cab greenhouse, i.e., the area directly in front and to the right of the 
truck, is crashes with non-motorists (pedestrians and pedal-cyclists). 
• Most of the non-motorists struck by trucks are adults.  
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• Start-up and right-turn crashes occur at low speeds.   
A method for evaluating cab obstruction is therefore proposed that evaluates the 
percentage of the standing adult pedestrian population that is visible at a range of target 
points near the cab. The goal of the evaluation method is to provide a meaningful relative 
measure of the direct and indirect fields of view in the area near the cab.  An ideal 
measure will be  
• scaled such that a score that is twice as high represents approximately twice as 
much risk; 
• calculated in such a manner that credit is not given for additional visibility 
beyond that required to address the problem; and 
• selected such that attention to the measure will tend to produce safer designs. 
The method presented here evaluates the percentage of the adult population that would be 
obscured from a representative driver eye point at a large number of sample points on the 
ground plane near the cab.  Summing obscured fractions across the sample points gives a 
quantitative measure of the vision obstruction posed by the cab. 
5.2 Evaluation Method  
1. Obtain a computer model of the vehicle to be evaluated. 
Although it would be technically feasible to perform these measurements and 
calculations with an actual vehicle, the procedure is intended to be performed using 
computer-aided design (CAD) software.  A CAD model of the vehicle that includes all 
relevant vision obstructions is needed.  For the current purposes, that includes the hood 
and the “greenhouse,”  i.e., the outlines of the window openings on the cab.  All mirrors 
should be included, since they provide indirect vision and also obstruct direct vision.  
Figure 30 shows the minimum information based on measurements of an example truck 
cab.  The CAD data must include an appropriate ground plane for the vehicle.  Since 
some cabs are used in multiple configurations with different grounds, separate analyses 




Figure 30. Computer model of vision obstructions for the example vehicle, including window perimeters 
and the hood.  The viewing point (representative driver eye point) is shown with a black dot. 
2.  Establish a viewing point. 
These calculations are performed from a single viewing point.  Unlike some 
vision analyses intended to assess a worst case (e.g., the mirror viewing tasks for school 
buses in FMVSS 111, which use a small-female eye location), the intent of the current 
procedure can be readily fulfilled using an average eye location.  The recommended 
approach is to use the centroid of an appropriately positioned cyclopean driver eyellipse 
for each vehicle, which is an estimate of the average driver eye location on the driver 
lateral centerline.  The SAE J941 Class-B eyellipse (SAE 2005) or a newer eyellipse 
(Reed 2005) could be used.  To preserve the comparability of the analyses across 
vehicles, the same procedure should be used to locate the viewing point in each vehicle.  
2. Establish a grid of sample points. 
Figure 31 shows the layout of the sample points.  Beginning at the front bumper 
and vehicle centerline, a grid is constructed with 0.5 m pitch.  The grid wraps around the 
sides of the vehicle to the back of the cab.  The sample points are at the centers of the 0.5-
x-0.5-m squares defined by the grid.  The grid is 10 m wide and 10 m long, with the 
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center of the grid at the projection of the front bumper onto the ground at the lateral 
centerline of the vehicle.  The 10-m width was chosen to approximately span the width of 
three lanes (3 x 3.7 m = 11.1 m).  The fore-aft length is more arbitrary, but extends 
approximately one car length in front of the bumper and rearward past the back of the cab 
for most trucks.  (See section 5.4 for more discussion of the choice of sampling points.) 
 
 
Figure 31. Laying out sample points (plan view).  Each intersection point on the grid is a sample point. 
3.  Compute the minimum view height at each sample point.   
This procedure determines the minimum height that is visible at each sample 
point.  Determine the point on a vertical line through the sampling point such that a line 
from the viewing point intersecting any lower point on the vertical line would also 




Figure 32. Establishing the minimum view height (schematic in side view). 
 
Figure 33 shows the results of calculating minimum view heights on the grid for 
the example cab geometry.  For the areas in front of the hood, the lines indicate the 
minimum height of an object that would be visible at the corresponding ground-plane 
location.  Sampling points at which a vertical line is completely obscured area shown 
with red vertical lines.  The A-pillars create noteworthy three-dimensional effects.  
Because the A-pillar slopes rearward in this geometry, there are sampling points within 
the ground-plane A-pillar obscuration at which an object of a sufficient height is visible.  





Figure 33. Illustration of direct view heights on sampling points.  A vertical red line indicates that a vertical 
line through the sampling point is completely obscured.  A black line indicates that the view is partially 
obscured and shows the minimum height that is visible. The obstruction perimeters on the ground plane are 
shown for the windows and windshield (red lines) and hood (cyan line). 
 
4.  Compute the fraction of the pedestrian population visible at the view height. 
The pedestrian population is modeled as a 50/50 male/female population having 
the distribution given by the 1990 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 
known as NHANES III (NCHS 1994).  Male stature is modeled as a normal distribution5 
with mean 1755 mm and standard deviation 74.2 m.  The female stature distribution has 
mean 1618 mm and standard deviation 68.7 m.  An adjustment of 25 mm is added to 
account for shoes, and a multiplier of 0.82 is used to estimate shoulder height from 
stature.  The result is the adult pedestrian viewing height distribution shown in Figure 34.  
To simplify the calculations, the distribution is approximated using a linear function 
between the 1st and 99th percentiles: 
                                                
5 The mean and standard deviation have been selected to obtain a good fit in the tails of an approximating 
normal distribution.  The actual mean and standard deviation are somewhat different. 
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F(Z) =  
Z < 1.19 m   0 
1.19 m ≤ Z ≤ 1.54 m  (z – 1.19)/(1.19 – 1.54) 
Z > 1.54 m  1 [1] 
where Z is the viewed height and F(Z) is the fraction of the pedestrian population that is 
obscured.  Under the approximation, the adult pedestrian population is fully visible for 
viewing heights at or below 1.19 m, and fully obscured for viewing heights above 
1.54 m. 
 
Figure 34.  Fraction of adult pedestrian population that is visible as a function of  
view height from the ground. 
 
Figure 35 shows the obscured fraction as a set of vertical lines at the sampling 
points.  A vertical line 1 m tall indicates that the population is fully obscured at that point.  
No vertical line indicates that the population is fully visible (or that the sampling point is 





Figure 35. Depiction of the fraction of the population that is obscured for direct vision for the example 
vehicle geometry.   A vertical red line (all are 1-m tall) indicates that the population is completely obscured 
and a vertical black line indicates fractional obscuration (height is fractional obscuration times one meter).  
The obscuration boundaries at the 1.2 m plane are shown. Pedestrian obscuration calculations were not 
performed for mirrors. 
 
Figure 35 shows that most of the obscuration on the sample grid is due to the 
greenhouse rather than the hood for the example vehicle.  In some circumstances, it might 
be valuable to evaluate only the hood or the A-pillars.  Figure 36 shows the results of 





Figure 36. Fraction of the pedestrian population obscured by the hood.  A vertical black line indicates 
fractional obscuration (height is fractional obscuration times one meter).  The obscuration boundaries at the 
1.2 m plane for the hood (cyan) and greenhouse (red) are shown. 
5. Compute an Aggregate Obscuration Score 
For comparing across cab designs, a single score may be desirable.  One approach 
is to multiply the fractional pedestrian population obscurations by the plan-view area 
represented by each sample point (0.25 m2 in the current example) and sum across the 
sample points.   A lower score is better, indicating less obscuration.  Using this approach, 
the aggregate score for the analysis in Figure 36 (hood obscuration only) is 3.2 m2.  
Lowering the front hood points by 0.2 m improves the score to 1.0 m2.  Figure 37 shows 
the analysis with the lowered hood points.  In this case, the obscuration caused by the 
bottom of the windshield becomes more important on the right side of the cab than the 




Figure 37. Fraction of the pedestrian population obscured by the hood, using the example cab geometry 
with front hood points lowered by 0.2 m. A vertical black line indicates fractional obscuration (height is 
fractional obscuration times one meter).  The obscuration boundaries at the 1.2 m plane for the hood (cyan) 
and greenhouse (red) are shown. 
 
5.3 Discussion 
This method provides a numerical evaluation of cab obscuration that is based on 
detection of adult pedestrians near the cab.  This method is designed specifically to 
address start-up and right-turn crashes with nonmotorists.  As shown in Section 3, the 
nonmotorist involved these types of fatal crashes is usually directly in front of or to the 
right-front of the truck at the time the truck driver begins the maneuver.  Hence, 
improving driver vision in these areas may reduce the incidence of these crashes.   
Some parameters of the method have been set somewhat arbitrarily.  For example, 
the 0.5-m pitch on the sampling grid corresponds roughly to the plan-view volume 
occupied by a standing pedestrian, but a finer grid would produce smoother measures of 
the effects of changes in cab geometry and would reduce the likelihood of missing the 
effect of a potentially important geometric feature.  Of course, sampling at more points 
increases the effort required to perform an assessment.  The overall grid size (10 m x 10 
m) is also somewhat arbitrary.  A larger grid would provide a better gage of pillar 
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obscuration, and a grid that extended further to the rear might be valuable for assessing 
mirror fields of view.   Regardless of the sampling points used, comparable values can 
only be obtained across vehicles designs if the same grid is used.   
The practicality of the procedure depends substantially on the time required to 
evaluate the view height at a plan view location.  The sample calculations used in this 
report were performed in Mathematica using highly abstract vehicle geometry, and the 
calculations could be performed essentially instantaneously.  However, for use with 
existing CAD geometry it may be more feasible to program the calculations as CAD 
macros.  For most analyses, it would not be necessary to evaluate the view height at all of 
the sample points in the grid.  For example, the results in Figure 36 could be obtained by 
evaluating only 40 sample points.   
The proposed procedure is somewhat analogous to computing the obscuration 
area on a plane 1.2 m above the ground plane.  The area within the 1.2-m obscuration 
boundary will be roughly proportional to the score obtained by the proposed procedure.  
For complex cab geometry, computing the projected area may be more difficult than 
computing the view height at sampling points on a grid.  Further investigation of the 
relative merits of the two approaches should be conducted.       
The example calculations focused exclusively on direct vision, but indirect vision 
assessments could be made using the same method.  In this case, the three-dimensional 
mirror fields of view would be included in the calculations of visible area.  Viewing an 
area with a mirror is less desirable than a direct view of the area, and hence it would be 
desirable to “penalize” mirrors when comparing designs that combine direct and indirect 
view of an area.  The appropriate penalty should be related to the performance of people 
using the mirror system to detect targets of interest, e.g., vehicles and nonmotorists.  
Intuitively, performance might be expected to be a function of the curvature of the mirror 
(convex mirrors providing worse performance than planar mirrors) and the distance from 
the driver to the mirror.   Other factors, such as the size of the mirror and weather 
conditions, might also be important.   
The experimental study presented in Section 3 provides one approach to 
comparing detection performance with direct view and convex mirrors.   For example, 
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the drivers took approximately twice as long to detect a vehicle directly to the right of the 
cab using a convex mirror as they did on the left side of the vehicle using predominantly 
direct vision.  This suggests that, as a starting point, vision near the cab using a convex 
mirror should be discounted 50% relative to direct vision.  So, if the entire pedestrian 
population were obscured for direct vision at a particular sample point, but fully visible 
using a convex mirror, the score would be 0.5.  Further experimental work could quantify 
the relative value of direct and indirect vision (particularly using convex mirrors) for 
detecting pedestrians using the reaction-time measure.  
The proposed method does not take into account the effects of head movements or 
binocular vision, both of which can alter the effective obscuration, particularly for the 
left-side A-pillar and mirror.  However, since the goal is to produce a relative measure 
that is useful across vehicles, a single representative viewing point is probably sufficient.  
To take into account the effects of binocular vision and head movement, the analysis 
could be performed for each sample point using two eye locations, with the better value 
used for the aggregate calculation.   For example, if the pedestrian population would be 
completely obscured at a sample point from the right eyellipse centroid, but visible from 
the left eyellipse centroid, the population could be considered to be completely visible at 
that point.   
The method could be extended to cover all areas around the vehicle, but the 
meaning of the analysis would be strongly dependent on the appropriateness of the 
penalty used for indirect vision systems.  Anecdotally, a convex mirror has a “sweet spot” 
corresponding to a distance from the mirror at which a pedestrian is most readily 
detected.  If the pedestrian is closer, the distortion creates problems with identification.  If 
the pedestrian is further from the mirror, the distortion and minification may make the 
pedestrian difficult to detect.  An appropriate performance-based scoring system is 
needed that would appropriately account for the differences in quality of field of view for 
different indirect vision systems.  This will be particular important for evaluating the 
potential benefits of camera based systems over mirrors and for comparing alternative 
camera locations, display characteristics, etc.   As noted above, the reaction-time 
paradigm, using direct-vision or planar-mirror detection time as a control, may be a good 







6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Primary Findings 
About 20 percent of crashes initiated by trucks occur in configurations in which 
limitations to truck driver vision may have been an important factor contributing to the 
crash.  Right-going lane changes and turns account for more than half of these crashes.  
In contrast, lane changes and turns to the left account for only about 12 percent.  Data on 
crash contact points also show more frequent contacts on the right side of the truck than 
on the left.  The locations of contact points in lane-change/merge scenarios show a strong 
bias toward the front of the vehicle (adjacent to the cab) for right-going crashes, whereas 
left-going crashes are more evenly distributed.  On average, right-going truck-initiated 
crashes are about 4.5 times more likely than left-going crashes. 
Using an in-depth analysis of police accident reports (PARs), the pre-crash 
positions of the crash partners were determined for a subset of potentially vision-related 
crashes.   The analysis further implicates vision along the right side of the truck, and 
particularly directly adjacent to the cab, in lane-change/merge crashes into other vehicles. 
Data from the PAR analysis showed that nonmotorists killed in start up and right turn 
crashes were usually in front of or to the right of the cab immediately prior to the crash.  
Nonmotorists killed in start up and right turn crashes with trucks were nearly all adults 
and tend to be older than pedestrians struck in other crash modes. Over half of 
pedestrians involved in start up crashes are over age 65.    
The experimental study presented in Section 3 showed that driver performance in 
detecting lane-change conflicts was directionally consistent with the findings from the 
crash data.  Drivers took longer to detect conflicts on the right side of the vehicle than on 
the left.  The longest reaction times were observed when the target vehicle was directly to 
the right of the cab, suggesting that detecting a conflict in this area is most difficult for 
drivers.  Drivers also made more errors on the right side of the vehicle, including several 
failures to detect a vehicle directly to the right of the cab.   
Based on these findings, a prioritized set of vision zones was developed (Section 
4).  The highest priority for improvements to driver vision is the area directly to the right 
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of the truck cab.  This area represents the most likely position of a crash partner at the 
truck driver’s decision point in right lane-change crashes and is also the pre-crash 
position of many nonmotorists involved in right turn and start up crashes.    The entire 
area on the right side of the truck, and the area to the rear of the truck, also merit 
additional attention, based on the relatively large percentage of crashes in which truck 
drivers fail to detect conflicts in these areas.  An additional priority zone was established 
directly in front of the vehicle to address start up crashes involving nonmotorists.  
Although these crashes occur at low speeds, the vulnerability of the nonmotorists makes 
these crashes particularly lethal.      
6.2 Evaluating Direct and Indirect Exterior Vision from Truck Cabs 
Section 5 presents a new approach to evaluating exterior vision from truck cabs.  
The method differs from previous approaches, e.g., SAE J1750, by providing an 
aggregate score that is related to a specific crash-safety issue.  The method is based on 
the visibility of standing adult pedestrians, and hence addresses the specific problem of 
pedestrian involvement in start up and right turn crashes.  Quantitative comparisons 
between vehicle designs with respect to exterior vision can be conducted using the new 
method.   
The experimental paradigm presented in Section 3 also represents a promising 
approach to evaluating the quality of exterior vision provided by alternative vision 
systems.  The time drivers require to determine if a conflict exists provides a sensitive 
measure of the difficulty of the task.  The parallels between the findings of the 
experimental study and the crash data analysis support the validity of the experimental 
approach.  This method could be applied to evaluate alternative mirror systems, camera-
based systems, and other technologies that might be developed to address the priorities 
established in this report.   
6.3 Future Research 
Given the scope of the problem documented by the crash data analysis, 
considerably more work is needed to address truck driver vision.  Additional analysis of 
crash data would help to quantify the problem more completely and with greater 
precision.   A relatively small effort would be required to double or triple the number of 
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PARs analyzed to address the pre-crash configurations in LCM, right turn, and start up 
crashes.  Adding more data to these analyses would narrow the confidence bounds and 
provide a more complete picture of the vision improvement needs near the cab. 
Data from the Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) have become 
available this year.  The LTCCS dataset includes highly detailed information on a 
nationally representative sample of 963 crashes involving heavy trucks.  The data are 
much richer than those in GES or TIFA, and include considerably more detail than is 
found in typical PARs.  Although the total number of cases is small, these data are 
expected to be valuable for addressing vision-related questions. For example, the LTCCS 
contains specific information on mirror configurations that is lacking from other datasets.  
In addition, each crash investigation is documented with numerous photographs, 
including the interior of the cab from the driver’s point of view.  A study of vision-related 
factors in the LTCCS should be conducted to complement the analyses presented in the 
current report.   
The experimental investigation reported in Section 3 used only six subjects but 
nonetheless yielded some valuable results.  More experimental work should be conducted 
along similar lines with the dual objectives of (1) developing a robust experimental 
methodology for quantifying the quality of the view provided by an indirect vision 
system, and (2) evaluating the performance of alternative indirect vision systems that 
may help to address the substantial driver vision issues documented in this report.   
Elements that should be included in future studies include: 
• alternative targets, including motorcyclists, pedestrians, and pedalcyclists; and 
• alternative indirect vision systems, including various combinations of the 
current planar and convex mirrors, aspheric convex mirrors, and camera-based 
systems. 
Older drivers will be an important cohort in future studies because of cognitive and 
perceptual differences with younger drivers and because they represent an increasing 
percentage of truck drivers. 
The parking-lot experimental approach also should be validated in a dynamic 
setting.  One naturalistic approach would be to examine the time that drivers use to make 
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right-going and left-going lane-change judgments in traffic.  Consistency between the 
right/left ratios on-road and in the static situation would support the validity of the static 
approach. 
On-road data collection would also be valuable to understand more completely 
how drivers use their mirrors.  Many trucks are currently equipped with five, six, or more 
mirrors.   How do drivers use these mirrors, many of which have partially redundant 
fields of view?  It is possible that having fewer but more-optimal mirrors would provide 
improved performance by reducing scanning demands.  In-vehicle studies with 
alternative mirror configurations could address this issue. 
Experimental studies should also be conducted to address the detection of 
pedestrians with direct vision.  The analysis method presented in Section 5 assumes that 
the pedestrian must be fully visible above the shoulders to be seen by the driver.  A 
reaction-time approach to detection might be a useful way to quantify the amount of a 
pedestrian that must be visible to provide reliable detection.  As with the other conflict-
detection studies, consideration of background contrast and target position will be 
important.  
The CAD-based vision evaluation method presented in Section 5 should be 
applied to a number of truck cabs to determine its feasibility and utility.  Determining 
whether the calculations are best performed in CAD software or in an external program 
will be an important first step.  More research is needed to establish an appropriate 
method for balancing A-pillar and hood obstruction.   The current method, based solely 
on pedestrian obscuration, does not take into account the distance from the truck.  Any 
pedestrian obscuration directly in front of the hood is problematic, but pedestrians 
obstructed by the A-pillar are not directly in danger.  Any relative motion of the truck and 
pedestrian that increased the likelihood of conflict may also increase the likelihood that 
the pedestrian will become visible to the truck driver.  Further analytical studies of truck 
motions in right-turn scenarios may provide a means to quantify the relative importance 
of hood and A-pillar obstructions for pedestrian protection.  Combined with further 
analysis of crash data, these analytic studies might yield an appropriate metric for 
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